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FROM MAINSTREAMING TO MARGINALIZATION?-
IDEA'S DE FACTO SEGREGATION CONSEQUENCES 
AND PROSPECTS FOR RESTORING EQUITY IN 
SPECIAL EDUCATION 
"We conclude that in the field of public education, the doctrine of 
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities 
are inherently unequal."1 
-Brown v. Board of Education 
Some judicial opinions are so iconic in their sentiment and per-
vasive in their reach as to become imprinted on the nation's col-
lective conscience. Such is the case with these words from Chief 
Justice Warren in the Supreme Court's 1954 Brown v. Board of 
Education decision, holding that racially segregated educational 
facilities violate an individual's rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 2 In the broader context, 
these words represent an enduring aspiration that continues to 
inform policy and signals the need for course correction when le-
gal or judicial discourse strays from equality principles. 
In contrast to Brown's powerful sentiments, other judicial rhet-
oric intended to invoke similar principles of equality and human 
dignity has been readily forgotten or invalidated by practical cir-
cumstances and situational realities. A simple observation from a 
1980 Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling belongs to this latter 
category: "This case is about Amy."3 
1. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
2. Id. at 493. 
3. Rowley v. Ed. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 946 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added). 
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With these five simple words, the Second Circuit introduced its 
opinion affirming a lower court judgment that directed a New 
York school district to provide a sign language interpreter to an 
eight-year-old deaf girl, Amy Rowley. 4 The court's pronouncement 
was intended to be powerful in its simplicity and similarly influ-
ential in its call to take account of the individual rights at stake. 
Yet in the ensuing legal narrative stemming from Board of Edu-
cation v. Rowley, which culminated in the Supreme Court's con-
sideration of standards for service entitlements under federal 
disability education law,5 these words were dismissively ignored. 
The Supreme Court's decision in what had begun as a "case about 
Amy" accorded virtually no consideration to Amy's specific educa-
tional needs or achievement potential. The resulting minimalistic 
Rowley standard for determining when a school district meets its 
obligation to provide special needs students with appropriate ed-
ucational services now stands as one of many legal, judicial, and 
social influences that compromised the original equity goals of 
disability education law, to the disadvantage of Amy and count-
less other special needs students. 
Despite the vast difference in resonance of the two judicial pro-
nouncements introduced above-one enduring, one essentially 
forgotten-they are linked at the complex and conflicting inter-
section of race, class, and special education rights. They reveal 
the inherent tensions that arise when commitments to equality 
and commitments to individual interests struggle to find common 
ground. The resulting conflict provides an ironic subtext to an on-
going crisis of conscience in special education, which is provoked 
by statutory procedural requirements, judicial interpretations, 
and social forces that fail to reinforce the equality goals on which 
disability education rights were founded. 
The inequities that now compromise special education are all 
the more disturbing because special education policy originated 
as "one of the many equity-oriented legacies of Brown."6 The Su-
preme Court's Brown decision resonated with families of disabled 
children who responded by challenging practices that segregated 
the disabled student population7 or deprived such children of edu-
4. Id. at 948. 
5. See 458 U.S. 176, 209-10 (1982). 
6. Beth A. Ferri & David J. Connor, Tools of Exclusion: Race, Disability, and 
(Re)segregated Education, 107 TCHRS. C. REC. 453, 456 (2005). 
7. See Andrea Valentino, Note, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Im· 
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cational opportunities altogether. 8 The ruling cast a spotlight on 
the extreme disparity in educational services for disabled chil-
dren, prompted federal disability education rights lawsuits,9 and 
provoked expansive lobbying efforts by families of disabled stu-
dents to improve, educational resources available to Collec-
tively, these initiatives resulted in the enactment of comprehen-
sive federal disability education legislation, first in the form of 
the Education for Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA") in 
1975, 10 and subsequently a series of reauthorization measures 
provement Act: Changing What Constitutes an "Appropriate" Education, 20 J.L. & HEALTH 
139, 142-43 (2007) (portraying Brown as a catalyst for parents of disabled children to 
begin challenging school districts for the segregation of disabled students or denial of edu-
cation opportunities to such children). Such challenges initially were presented in two fed-
eral district court cases that both issued rulings supporting providing disabled students 
access to public education. Id. at 143. In Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania, the district court enjoined state officials and school districts from denying or 
delaying "any mentally retarded child access to a free public program of education and 
training." 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The following year, Mills v. Board of 
Education held that no child eligible for public education shall be excluded from a public 
school placement unless "such child is provided (a) adequate alternative educational ser-
vices suited to the child's needs, which may include special education or tuition grants, 
and (b) a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review of the child's status, 
progress, and the adequacy of any educational alternative." 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 
1972). 
8. Martha Minow, Surprising Legacies of Brown v. Board, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 
11, 25 (2004) ("Prior to the 1970s, only seven states provided education for more than half 
of their children with disabilities. Those children with disabilities who did receive educa-
tional programming did so largely in classrooms or schools removed from their [non-
disabled] peers."). 
9. By the early 1970s, exclusion of disabled children from public education opportu-
nities provoked a number of federal lawsuits, most notably, Mills v. Board of Education 
and Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. 
Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 
1257 (E.D. Pa 1971) (per curiam). Although the factual basis of Pennsylvania Ass'n for Re-
tarded Children and Mills differed somewhat, both cases yielded similar judicial findings 
concerning the exclusion of disabled children from public educational settings, an exclu-
sion precipitated by the government's lack of resources. This exclusion, however, was not 
related to government savings goals or any other rational state goal because uneducated 
citizens arguably pose an even greater burden on the state, and the intentional exclusion 
of children with disabilities from public schools is a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause. See Pa. Ass'n for Retarded Children, 334 F. Supp. at 
1259; Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876. The resulting rulings provided that children with disabil-
ities were to be admitted to public schools and provided with educational services as ap-
propriate to their individual needs. See MICHAEL IMBER ET AL., EDUCATION LAW 254-55 
(5th ed., 2014). In addition, schools were to follow specified procedures when classifying 
children and determining their placements and services in the overall educational curricu-
lum. Id. 
10. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 
773; see Valentino, supra note 7, at 144. 
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known currently as the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act ("ID EA''). 11 
Clearly, both Brown and IDEA were dedicated to the successful 
integration of groups historically excluded from mainstream edu-
cational opportunities. 12 Yet, while both can be read as landmark 
measures furtherance of social justice, they must also be rec-
ognized as symbols of the practical limitations of judicially led so-
cial reform. 13 the case of Brown's ultimate impact on public 
school integration, a strong argument can be made that although 
the ruling precluded state-sponsored segregation measures, "it 
did not mandate implementation of meaningful equality."14 Since 
Brown, measures to enforce the prohibition against de jure segre-
gation by preventing government-endorsed separation of races in 
public schools have continued to coexist alongside practices that 
encourage race-based subordination. 15 De facto school segregation 
continues to be tolerated and even promoted in many communi-
ties as an outgrowth of individual choices, entrenched social 
d h o ~ norms, or emograp ic patterns. 
Similarly, despite the direct legacy of Brown's equality princi-
ples, judicial readings of IDEA and the procedural construct of 
the Act itself have reintroduced class-based discriminatory prac-
tices and racial segregation the equation, if not as overt prac-
tices, then at least as functional realities. 17 Since the Brown rul-
ing, there has been a noted lack of progress in racial integration 
of schools nationwide. 18 This, part, has resulted from "re-
segregation" consequences of racially discriminatory educational 
tracking practices that counter integration initiatives. 19 Over-
11. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2012); see Valentino, supra note 7, at 145; see also infra 
Part I.A. For consistency and ease of reference, current federal disability education statu-
tory provisions and all legacy versions of the statute will be referenced as IDEA through-
out this comment. 
12. Jean B. Crockett, The Least Restrictive Environment and the 1997 IDEA Amend-
ments and Federal Regulations, 28 J.L. & EDUC. 543, 544 (1999). 
13. See Minow, supra note 8, at 12. 
14. Zanita E. Fenton, Disabling Racial Repetition, in RIGHTING EDUCATIONAL 
WRONGS: DISABILITY STUDIES IN LAW AND EDUCATION 174, 182 (Arlene 8. Kanter & Beth 
A. Ferri eds., 2013). 
15. See Martha Minow, Universal Design in Education: Remaking All the Difference, 
in RIGHTING EDUCATIONAL WRONGS: DISABILITY STUDIES IN LAW AND EDUCATION 38, 49 
(Arlene S. Kanter & Beth A. Ferri eds., 2013). 
16. See id. 
17. See Ferri & Conner, supra note 6, at 454. 
18. See id. 
19. See generally Minow, supra note 15. 
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representation of students of color special education programs 
is one of many factors that has produced a resurgence of segre-
gated schools and an even greater incidence of segregated class-
rooms within schools. 20 The inequitable impact of this pattern is 
exacerbated by IDEA's procedural norms that privilege wealthier 
families and result in disproportionate representation of wealthi-
er students in "advocacy successes" for special services, further 
segregating disabled students by privilege in private special edu-
. . 21 
cation settmgs. 
As a basic construct for recommending measures to correct the 
prevailing inequities in special education, this comment examines 
the de facto segregation impact IDEA stemming from the Su-
preme Court's interpretive rulings and from the Act's own en-
forcement norms. The analysis further identifies the equality-
compromising consequences of specific IDEA provisions and con-
siders prospects for restoring equity to special needs service de-
livery in these areas, with a particular focus on tuition reim-
bursement for private school. Respecting the historical alignment 
of the law of race discrimination in education and the law of disa-
bility education rights,22 the analysis identifies inequities that 
prevail at the intersection of disability, special education service 
needs, and poverty. 23 This perspective is offered with a view to-
ward establishing the thesis that IDEA, despite its aspirational 
equality premise, has been interpreted and implemented in a 
manner that marginalizes disabled students from minority and 
economically disadvantaged groups. 
Part I of this comment provides an overview of IDEA provisions 
and implementation regulations followed by a review of judicial 
interpretations in landmark IDEA service delivery cases, specifi-
cally the Supreme Court's Rowley ruling. Drawing upon both le-
gal and educational scholarship, this analysis then assesses how 
IDEA's aspirational equality goals ultimately devolved into de 
facto segregation in special education. Part II considers factors 
resulting from the Supreme Court's tuition reimbursement rul-
ings that trend away from IDEA's original equality purpose and 
20. See Ferri & Connor, supra note 6, at 454. 
21. See infra Part III.A. 
22. See infra Part IV.B. 
23. See Jennifer Rosen Valverde, A Poor IDEA: Statute of Limitations Decisions Ce-
ment Second-Class Remedial Scheme for Low-Income Children with Disabilities in the 
Third Circuit, 41 FORDHAM URE. L.J. 599, 619 (2013). 
: 
.I 
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integration preference to compromise equality in four ways: creat-
ing a means-based bias in private school placement; undermining 
IDEA's cooperative paradigm and promoting litigation; con-
travening IDEA's inclusion preference; and inviting discriminato-
ry special education resourcing practices. Part III evaluates social 
factors and educational perspectives that compound the adverse 
consequences of tuition reimbursement rulings and practices that 
both inform and challenge any measures to reinvigorate the 
IDEA equality premise. Part IV critiques how IDEA's procedural 
protocols and enforcement practices inadvertently or subversively 
introduce class-based inequities into special education programs 
and services, thereby creating an excessively adversarial climate 
that particularly disadvantages families without means. Recog-
nizing the breadth of statutory, judicial, and societal factors that 
have impeded, stalled, or even reversed equality goals of disabil-
ity education, the analysis concludes in Part V with recommenda-
tions for various resourcing, advocacy, and structural reforms to 
reintroduce prospects for equity in special education services. 
I. STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL READINGS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION 
ACCESS AND SERVICE EQUITIES 
Brown v. Board of Education provides the template for de-
manding both equal opportunity in procuring educational services 
and integration for students with disabilities. 24 While Brown es-
tablished the principle that all students, regardless of race, are 
guaranteed equal educational opportunities, IDEA accords stu-
dents with disabilities "an equal right to public education in a 
structure that is meaningful for them."25 In this regard, federal 
disability education law operates as both an entitlement and an 
equality commitment.26 The natural tensions that flow from judi-
cial and legislative attempts to balance these competing premises 
have unintentionally introduced inequities and segregating forces 
into disability educational services. This part briefly reviews the 
sources of such competing tensions in disability education legisla-
tion and seminal Supreme Court rulings interpreting those legis-
lative provisions. 
24. Minow, supra note 8, at 29. 
25. See Alessandra Perna, Note, Breaking the Cycle of Burdensome and Inefficient 
Special Education Costs Facing Local School Districts, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 541, 548 
(2015). 
26. See Minow, supra note 8, at 26. 
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A IDEA-Equality Premise in Principle Only? 
While IDEA has a place in assuring education access rights to 
disabled students, it is not fundamentally a civil rights statute, 
but is instead a social policy and spending clause statute.27 Its 
primary purpos~ is to ensure, through federal funding, 28 that 
states can provide disabled students access to an educational pro-
gram and related services tailored to meet their individual 
needs. 29 Together, the special educational program and related 
services define the core of IDEA entitlement-the "free and ap-
propriate public education" ("F APE") to which every special needs 
child served by the Act is entitled.30 Each child's FAPE entitle-
ment must defined by an Individualized Education Plan 
("IEP"), which is designed and updated annually by a collabora-
tive team of education specialists from the school district and the 
child's parents. 31 
IDEA requires states receiving funding to institute procedures 
to assure that "[t]o the maximum extent appropriate, children 
with disabilities ... are educated with children who are not disa-
bled .... "32 This inclusion requirement was intended to signal the 
end of categorizing, labeling, and segregating disabled students 
special classrooms, but not the end of necessary supports and 
services. 33 IDEA's commitment to integration of disabled students 
into the general education environment, to the extent feasible 
within the scope of a child's IEP, prescribes instruction in the 
27. See Ruth O'Brien, What a Difference Thirty Years-1978 to 2008-Makes in the 
Transformation of Disability Law, 50 TULSAL. REV. 367, 377 (2015). 
28. Christopher L. Tazzi, Note, Incentivizing Cooperation: A Solution to Forest Grove's 
Suboptimal Outcome, 36 J. LEGIS. 423, 427 (2010). 
29. See Minow, supra note 8, at 26. 
30. Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private Enforce-
ment, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1421 (2011); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400(d)(l)(A)-(B), 
1401(9), 1412(a)(l) (2012). 
31. Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1421; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d) (2012). 
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) (2012); see Stacey Lynn Sheon, Comment, Opening the 
Doors to a Quality Public Education for Children with Disabilities or Slamming Them 
Shut: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Treatment of Private-Tuition Reimbursement Un-
der the IDEA, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 599, 622-23 (2009); see also Brianna L. Lennon, Note, 
Cut and Run? Tuition Reimbursement and the 1997 IDEA Amendments, 75 Mo. L. REV. 
1297, 1320 (2010) ("IDEA does not require that all students remain in traditional class-
rooms, but it does create a continuum that intends that the degree of "inclusion" be driven 
by the student's needs as determined by the IEP team, not by the district's convenience or 
the parents' wishes."). 
33. Perna, supra note 25, at 551. 
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"least restrictive environment," a protocol typically known as 
mainstreaming or inclusion.34 
IDEA is unique among education programs that operate under 
a cooperative federalism structure because no public actor is 
tasked with reviewing or enforcing the substance of IEPs. 35 In-
stead, parents who wish to challenge the substantive content or 
procedural development of their disabled child's IEP have a for-
mal administrative hearing process and other due process protec-
tions available to them. 36 Their private enforcement rights also 
include availability of a mediation process with the school district 
about special education services37 and the right to file a complaint 
with the state education agency ("SEA"), challenging any aspect 
of special education service delivery. 38 
IDEA also includes a general relief provision, investing broad 
remedial authority in hearing officers or courts to order schools to 
take any number of "appropriate" measures to correct violations 
of the Act. 39 Remedial actions that courts can order to redress ed-
ucation service delivery lapses include modifying an IEP, provid-
ing a particular instructional placement or a related educational 
service, and various forms of compensatory education, tuition re-
imbursement, or direct payment for private educational alterna-
tives and services. 4° Congress codified tuition reimbursement in 
1997 and introduced a specific provision permitting reimburse-
ment for the cost of enrollment in private instructional settings 
under specific conditions when the school district failed to provide 
a FAPE.41 
34. Minow, supra note 8, at 26. 
35. Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1422. 
36. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(£)-(g) (2012); Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1422-23. 
37. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e); Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1423. 
38. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.151-53 (2015); Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1423. 
39. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(c)(iii); Katie Harrison, Comment, Direct Tuition Pay-
ments Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act: Equal Remedies for Equal 
Harm, 25 J. C.R. & ECON. DEV. 873, 882-83 (2011) (discussing IDEA's relief provisions, 
specifically as it concerns tuition reimbursement). 
40. See Elisa Hyman et al., How IDEA Fails Families Without Means: Causes and 
Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyering, 20'AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
PoL'Y & L. 107, 120 (2011); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1415(e)(l)-(2)(B). 
41. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-17, 111 Stat. 63 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)); infra Part I.C 
(discussing the Supreme Court's rulings on tuition reimbursement under both IDEA's 
general relief and specific reimbursement provisions). 
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In principle, IDEA's fundamental protections are considered 
significant disability rights and equality victories. 42 On their face, 
these provisions certainly afford disabled children and their par-
ents considerable "autonomy and control in construction of 
their educational experience."43 In enacting the fundamental ser-
vice delivery provisions of IDEA, Congress intended an appropri-
ate education for disabled students "to be synonymous an 
equal right to learn,''44 and further intended to ensure that par-
ents could meaningfully enforce their child's rights. 45 However, as 
a practical matter, IDEA implementation has not permitted these 
provisions to operate as the protections they were intended.46 To a 
considerable degree, the inequities that currently plague special 
education service delivery derive from misapplication or an insuf-
ficiently nuanced reading of IDEA's education service and private 
enforcement good intentions. 47 
B. Access over Opportunity in Rowley-Supporting De Facto 
Segregation? 
Among the fundamental origins of inequitable service delivery 
under IDEA is the absence of a judicial standard defining appro-
priate special education services in a manner that accords disa-
bled children educational opportunities equivalent to those avail-
able to students in the general education curriculum. Because 
special education statutes have not specifically defined an appro-
priate education, federal courts crafted their own definition. 48 The 
Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the "appropriate" 
standard in the seminal Rowley case in 1982, holding an ed-
ucation is appropriate according to the statute only if both proce-
dural and substantive standards are met when providing special 
42. See Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1424. 
43. Id. 
44. Jennifer L. Free, Comment, Equal Educational Opportunities and the Visually 
Impaired Student Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 37 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 203, 232 (2005). 
45. Matthew Saleh, Your Child's Rights: 6 Principles of IDEA, SMART KIDS WITH 
LEARNING DISABILITIES, http://www.smartkidswithld.org/getting-help/know-your-childs-
rights/your-childs-rights-6-principles-of-idea/. 
46. See Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1463. 
47. See id. at 1462-63 (discussing the limitations of IDEA's current private enforce-
ment strategies). 
48. Bonnie Spiro Schinagle, Considering the Individualized Education Program: A 
Call for Applying Contract Theory to an Essential Legal Document, 17 CUNY L. REV. 195, 
210 (2013). 
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needs services under an IEP.49 Critical to the Court's ruling was 
its finding that Congress primarily intended to accord disabled 
children access to education, but did not intend to ensure a par-
ticular educational outcome providing for equality of opportunity 
to special needs students. 50 
A brief overview of Amy Rowley's circumstances provides use-
ful context to understand the consequences of the Rowley ruling 
and the extent of its departure from equality principles in defin-
ing educational service delivery obligations for disabled students. 
Amy Rowley was born deaf, had minimal residual hearing, and 
was instructed since infancy by her parents in a total communica-
tion method that integrated sign language, amplification, and lip 
reading. 51 During Amy's first grade year in a New York public 
school, the school district prepared an IEP for her offering some 
specialized services, but did not include the services of a class-
room sign language interpreter as requested by Amy's parents to 
maximize her learning potential. 52 The school district's decision 
not to provide interpretive services was upheld by a hearing ex-
aminer and affirmed by the New York Commissioner of Educa-
tion.53 The Rowleys brought suit in district court, alleging that the 
school district's refusal to provide sign language interpretive ser-
vices constituted denial of a FAPE. 54 Evidence introduced by the 
Rowleys included results of auditory speech discrimination tests 
documenting that without sign language interpreter services, 
Amy could identify only 59% of words spoken to her in the class-
room, as compared with 100% of communication addressed to her 
with interpreter assistance. 55 
Considering such evidence, the district court essentially ad-
dressed the F APE standard as an equal protection measure and 
assessed equality in terms that far exceeded equality of access. 
The court determined that without interpretive services, Amy 
would not have the opportunity to achieve her full academic po-
tential commensurate with the opportunities afforded to other 
49. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 203-07 (1982); Theresa M. DeMonte, 
Comment, Finding the Least Restrictive Environment for Preschoolers Under the IDEA: An 
Analysis and Proposed Framework, 85 WASH. L. REV. 157, 168--70 (2010). 
50. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192; see also DeMonte, supra note 49, at 169. 
51. See Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 483 F. Supp. 528, 529-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
52. Id. at 530-31. 
53. Id. at 531. 
54. See id. at 529. 
55. See id. at 532. 
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children.56 Accordingly, the court found in favor of the Rowleys' 
position that interpretive services should have been provided un-
der Amy's IEP.57 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed and ex-
pressly adopted the district court's reasoning that IDEA support-
ed providing Amy assistance "to bring her educational 
opportunity up to the level of the educational opportunity being 
offered to her non-handicapped peers."58 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second 
Circuit's decision, viewing FAPE requirement far more re-
strictively.59 Instead of guaranteeing any particular level of edu-
cational opportunity or any measure of parity with non-disabled 
students, the Supreme Court ruled that a school district satisfies 
its obligation under IDEA if it provides a special needs student 
with services under an IEP that bring about "some benefit."60 The 
Court expressly noted that "the statute contains no requirement 
like the one imposed by the lower courts-that States maximize 
the potential of handicapped children 'commensurate with the 
opportunity provided to other children."'61 The Court concluded, 
therefore, that "the intent of the Act was more to open the door of 
public education to handicapped children on appropriate terms 
than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside."62 
The Rowley decision remains the only Supreme Court ruling de-
fining the extent of a school district's obligation to provide appro-
priate special education services to disabled children under IDEA 
and its predecessor statutes. 63 
Unfortunately, the Rowley standard compromises IDEA's 
equality premise two critical respects. First, it is substantively 
ambiguous and thus provokes considerable litigation between 
parents and school districts. 64 Without a strong substantive 
standard to gauge appropriateness, parents must approach ad-
versarial encounters school districts with an "incalculable 
56. See id. at 534. 
57. Id. at 529, 535. 
58. Rowley v. Bd. of Educ., 632 F.2d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1980). 
59. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179 (1982). 
60. See id. at 200-01. 
61. See id. at 189-90 (quoting Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534). 
62. Id. at 192. 
63. See DeMonte, supra note 49, at 168-70. 
64. See Natalie Pyong Kocher, Note, Lost in Forest Grove: Interpreting IDEA's Inher-
ent Paradox, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 333, 352-53 (2010). 
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probability of success."65 This circumstance is disproportionately 
burdensome to and essentially marginalizes means-challenged 
families. Of equal significance in undermining IDEA's equality 
premise is the failure of the Rowley standard to align with and 
support IDEA's commitment to "an equal right to learn for disa-
bled students."66 These deficiencies are noted not only to provide 
context to the Rowley ruling, but also to hjghlight how the depar-
tures from equality considerations in IDEA implementation have 
strong judicial roots, as well as legislative, social, and practical 
sources. 
As presented in Rowley, the core issue concerned whether 
IDEA's guarantee of an appropriate education for the disabled 
carries with it a right to a certain quality of education or whether 
Congress intended solely to eliminate the outright exclusion of 
disabled students from public schools. 67 The Supreme Court held 
that the F APE guarantee was far narrower than the level of ser-
vice delivery required to maximize a special needs student's po-
tential.68 In the end, the Court set a minimal appropriate educa-
tion standard in Rowley, indicating that a school district could 
meet its statutory obligation under IDEA if a FAPE provided a 
special needs student with access to a "basic floor of opportuni-
ty."69 The Court reasoned that, due to the absence of any refer-
ences in IDEA to "equal opportunity to learn or of maximizing the 
learning potential of disabled students, ... Congress did not in-
tend to require any particular substantive level of education."70 
The Court also found that equal educational opportunity was an 
65. Id. ("The absence of a substantive definition for an 'appropriate' education has 
caused considerable litigation between parents and school districts, and poses a significant 
hurdle for parents. Without the ability to gauge appropriateness, parents engaging in a 
cost/benefit analysis face an incalculable probability of success, and must blindly bear the 
risk of litigation."). 
66. See Free, supra note 44, at 205, 225-26 (noting that an evaluation of case law 
"demonstrates that courts looked to Rowley's 'equal access' standard and not to the act's 
substantive requirement of actual results" and explaining that although the 2004 IDEA 
reauthorization amendments affirmed congressional commitment to achieving demonstra-
ble progress and measurable education results for disabled children in the regular curricu-
lum, "this policy will likely go unrealized"). 
67. Id. at 214. 
68. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982). 
69. Id. at 200 ("Assuming that the Act was designed to fill the need identified in the 
House Report-that is, to provide a 'basic floor of opportunity' consistent with equal pro-
tection-neither the Act nor its history persuasively demonstrates that Congress thought 
that equal protection required anything more than equal access."). 
70. Free, supra note 44, at 219. 
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unworkable standard. 71 This of the ruling continues to gar-
ner criticism for its sharp departure from indicators in IDEA's 
legislative history that equality of opportunity for disabled stu-
dents consistent with that available to their non-disabled peers 
remains a fundafi!ental performance benchmark of the statute. 72 
By holding that the appropriate education requirement did not 
mandate that a state "maximize each [disabled] child's potential 
'commensurate with the opportunity provided other children,"' 
the Court expressly rejected an equal protection reading of 
IDEA. 73 The standard adopted in Rowley truncated the equality 
expectations of IDEA by defining disabled education rights in 
terms of access, regardless of achievement outcomes or the equal-
ity of disabled students' opportunities as compared with those 
available to their non-disabled peers. This standard particularly 
disadvantages special needs students like Amy Rowley, whose 
achievement without certain specialized support services falls far 
below their aptitude. 74 Under the Rowley standard, special needs 
students may be deemed to be receiving appropriate education 
services if they are able to advance from one grade to the next, 
regardless of whether their IEPs include services that would op-
timize their learning potential. 75 
In ruling that school districts satisfy their obligation to provide 
an appropriate education when they grant special needs students 
"little more than uniform access,"76 the Court, in effect, authorized 
a special education system defined by de facto segregation.77 The 
Rowley standard continues to ensure disabled students access to 
education without further assurance that such access is develop-
mentally meaningful or equivalent to opportunities available in 
the general education system. 
Under this approach, equal access, rather than equal oppor-
tunity, became and remained the standard for assessing school 
71. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198. 
72. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 212 (White, J., dissenting); Free, supra note 44, at 205, 
226. 
73. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198. 
74. RUTH COLKER, DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT 61-62 (2013). 
75. Id. 
76. Free, supra note 44, at 225. 
77. Id. at 222. 
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district compliance with statutory F APE requirements. 78 Some 
circuit court decisions have attempted to expand the Rowley 
standard to ensure meaningful educational opportunities for dis-
abled students. 79 However, other judicial applications of the rul-
ing and implementation practices under IDEA present practical 
barriers to the notion that special education services should offer 
equality of opportunity commensurate with that afforded to non-
disabled students. 80 A significant cross-section of lower court rul-
ings continue to evaluate a disabled child's placement as requir-
ing only the "floor of opportunity" articulated in Rowley. 81 
Although it is clear from Rowley that school districts are not 
obligated to provide the best possible special educational ser-
vices, 82 the ruling is nonetheless resoundingly criticized for its 
failure to sufficiently elaborate on the intended meaning and 
scope of "some benefit."83 The standard, which has been termed an 
78. See Philip T.K. Daniel, "Some Benefit" or "Maximum Benefit''.· Does the No Child 
Left Behind Act Render Greater Educational Entitlement to Students with Disabilities, 37 
J.L. & EDUC. 347, 349 (2008). 
79. See, e.g., Deal v. Hamilton Cty. Ed. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(noting deference to the Rowley standard, but expanding the standard as much as possible 
within its authority by providing that "IDEA requires ... a 'meaningful educational bene-
fit' gauged in relation to the potential of the child at issue"); Polk v. Cent. Susquehanna 
Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171, 173, 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that IDEA re-
quires an individualized education plan to provide "more than a trivial educational bene-
fit" and "significant learning"); see also DeMonte, supra note 49, at 169-70 (examining an 
array of lower court interpretations of the Rowley standard with interpretations ranging 
from "some educational benefit, no matter how insignificant" to "more than a de minimis 
educational benefit" to an education "designed to provide a meaningful educational bene-
fit"); Valentino, supra note 7, at 152-55 (examining circuit court decisions that attempted 
to expand the Rowley ruling to the extent feasible within the bounds of that decision, by 
taking into account subsequent IDEA amendments that suggest an intent to provide disa-
bled students with more meaningful benefits). 
80. See, e.g., Barber v. Bogalusa City Sch. Ed., 2001 WL 667829, at *14 (E.D. La. June 
12, 2001) (focusing on loss of opportunity versus equal opportunity commensurate with 
non-disabled students). Applying this logic to the current press for specialized support 
services and state-of-the-art educational environments for disabled students, a number of 
courts have resorted to the comparative "Chevy vs. Cadillac" analogy, noting that it is not 
the province of the court to seek out the availability of a "Cadillac" educational program 
when the school district offers an acceptable "Chevy." See, e.g., Troy Sch. Dist. v. 
Boutsikaris, 250 F. Supp. 2d 720, 735 (E.D. Mich. 2003). 
81. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 201 (1982); see Free, supra note 44, at 205 
(noting that an evaluation of case law demonstrates that courts tend to look to Rowley's 
"equal access" standard rather than IDEA's substantive requirement of actual results). 
82. See, e.g., Lewis M. Wasserman, Reimbursement to Pare~ts of Tuition and Other 
Costs Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, 21 ST. 
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 171, 194 (2006) (noting that the Rowley standard controls "un-
less the state where the child resides sets a higher standard"). 
83. See id. (commenting on the absence of elaboration in the Rowley opinion); Perna, 
supra note 25, at 559-61 (advocating for Congress to offer "a more focused and compre-
2016] FROMJ\ 
"abstract m1n1ma 
"far too subjectivE 
extent the ambig 
tion, 86 its equality 
the inherent him 
ents in advocacy ~ 
C. Tuition Reimb 
Discrepancy F 
With Rowley's 
cational services 
further potential 
tuition reimburse 
cial needs childre 
school services.ss: 
of Burlington v. 1 
Court interpreted 
equitable reimbu 
disabled children 
hensible legal standard" 
standard particularly ie 
varies with the individu 
to conflict with the cate 
(explaining how differen 
84. Free, supra note 
85. Kocher, supra n< 
86. Id. at 352-53 ('" 
tion has caused conside1 
significant hurdle for p2 
gaging in a cost/benefit 
blindly bear the risk ofl 
ity and lack of guidance 
parents. See Perna, supr 
standard, it is difficult f< 
bled student."). 
87. See infra Part II 
88. Emily Blumber§ 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
89. 471 U.S. 359 (19 
90. See Education fc 
Stat. 788 (codified at 2( 
(C)(iii) (2012)) (providin 
mines is appropriate" ir 
education services as re 
tent). 
91. Blumberg, suprc 
IJEW [Vol. 50:951 
iuirements. 78 Some 
xpand the Rowley 
1portunities for dis-
ications of the rul-
'\ present practical 
~rvices should off er 
at afforded to non-
of lower court rul-
acement as requir-
1 Rowley. 81 
)1 districts are not 
Ll educational ser-
y criticized for its 
Lded meaning and 
tas been termed an 
mefit''.· Does the No Child 
lents with Disabilities, 37 
W, 861-62 (6th Cir. 2004) 
1dard as much as possible 
ningful educational bene-
>lk v. Cent. Susquehanna 
3) (holding that IDEA re-
trivial educational bene-
at 169-70 (examining an 
li interpretations ranging 
"more than a de minimis 
7,ingful educational bene-
decisions that attempted 
1unds of that decision, by 
an intent to provide disa-
129, at *14 (E.D. La. June 
nity commensurate with 
s for specialized support 
ed students, a number of 
logy, noting that it is not 
lac" educational program 
e.g., Troy Sch. Dist. v. 
"e, supra note 44, at 205 
tend to look to Rowley's 
ent of actual results). 
its of Tuition and Other 
ment Act of 2004, 21 ST. 
ey standard controls "un-
Rowley opinion); Pe.rna, 
ore focused and compre-
2016] FROM MAINSTREAMING TO MARGINALIZATION? 965 
"abstract minimal benefit calculus,"84 is widely faulted for being 
"far too subjective and equivocal to be applied effectively."85 To the 
extent the ambiguous standard provokes excessive litiga-
tion, 86 its equality-compromising impact is exacerbated because of 
the inherent bia,p against socioeconomically disadvantaged par-
ents in advocacy and adversarial roles. 87 
C. Tuition Reimbursement Rulings-Inviting Opportunity 
Discrepancy Freefall? 
With Rowley's minimalistic standard for assessing special edu-
cational services firmly in place, the Supreme Court introduced 
further potential for IDEA implementation inequities in a line of 
tuition reimbursement cases involving parental placement of spe-
cial needs children in private schools as an alternative to public 
school services.88 In the first of these decisions, School Committee 
of Burlington v. Department of Education of Massachusetts, 89 the 
Court interpreted IDEA's judicial relief-granting power90 to allow 
equitable reimbursement for unilateral parental placements of 
disabled children in state-approved private schools91 court 
hensible legal standard" to amplify and clarify Rowley). Confusion surrounding the Rowley 
standard particularly is provoked by the Court's suggestion that the mandated benefit 
varies with the individual characteristics of the child involved, a statement that appears 
to conflict with the categorical "some benefit" standard. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202-03 
(explaining how different students may respond differently to the same instruction). 
84. Free, supra note 44, at 230. 
85. Kocher, supra note 64, at 352. 
86. Id. at 352-53 ("The absence of a substantive definition for an 'appropriate' educa-
tion has caused considerable litigation between parents and school districts, and poses a 
significant hurdle for parents. Without the ability to gauge appropriateness, parents en-
gaging in a cost/benefit analysis face an incalculable probability of success, and must 
blindly bear the risk of litigation."). In this regard, it is important to note that the ambigu-
ity and lack of guidance from the Rowley ruling adversely affects school districts as well as 
parents. See Perna, supra note 25, at 561 ('When the law does not offer a clear, delineated 
standard, it is difficult for a school district to determine what is appropriate for each disa-
bled student."). 
87. See infra Part II. 
88. Emily Blumberg, Recent Development, Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 45 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 163, 167 (2010). 
89. 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
90. See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 
Stat. 788 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (e)(2)) (current version at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) 
(C)(iii) (2012)) (providing, pertinently, that a court "shall grant such relief as [it] deter-
mines is appropriate" in instances where a school district has not provided appropriate 
education services as required by IDEA); see also supra Part I.A (concerning IDEA con-
tent). 
91. Blumberg, supra note 88, at 167. 
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ultimately determines that the private placement, rather than 
the [school district's IEP], is proper under IDEA."92 The Court lat-
er upheld and expanded this holding in Florence County School 
District Four v. Carter, 93 permitting parents to unilaterally place 
their child in private school, even in circumstances where the se-
lected private school was not approved by the state. 94 
Amendments to IDEA in 1997 introduced a specific tuition re-
imbursement relief provision95 that was interpreted by some cir-
cuit courts to preclude tuition reimbursement for students who 
had never previously received special education or related ser-
vices from a school district. 96 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to resolve a circuit court split on this issue and in Forest 
Grove School District v. T.A. 97 held that the 1997 amendments did 
not alter the meaning or intent of IDEA's "appropriate relief' 
provision under which Burlington and Carter had been decided.98 
The Court found that reimbursement continued to be available 
under IDEA's general relief provision for the cost of private school 
tuition when the school district failed to provide a F APE to a dis-
abled child and the private school placement proved appropriate, 
"even if the child not previously receive special education or 
related services from a public school" in the district. 99 The Court 
noted that reading the 1997 specific tuition reimbursement provi-
sion as an exclusive remedy (thus precluding tuition reimburse-
92. See Sheon, supra note 32, at 612. 
93. 510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
94. See id. at 13. 
95. Prior to 1997, reimbursement was awarded under IDEA's discretionary "appropri-
ate relief' provision. See supra Part I.A (discussing the 1997 Amendments to IDEA that 
added a specific reimbursement provision to then 10 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l)(C)(ii)). 
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2012) ("If the parents of a child with a disabil-
ity, who previously received special education and related services under the authority of a 
public agency, enroll the child in a private elementary school or secondary school without 
the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or a hearing officer may require the 
agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hearing of-
ficer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to 
the child in a timely manner prior to that enrollment."); Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 
358 F.3d 150, 159-60 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that "tuition reimbursement is only availa-
ble for children who have previously received 'special education and related services"'); 
Blumberg, supra note 88, at 167-68. 
97. 557 U.S. 230 (2009); see Sheon, supra note 32, at 614. The 1997 IDEA Amend-
ments were central to the tension between public schools and parents of disabled children 
in terms of service delivery and tuition reimbursement when the public school is alleged 
not to have provided appropriate education services. Id. at 600 n.10 and accompanying 
text. 
98. Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 247. 
99. Id.; Blumberg, supra note 88, at 171-72. 
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ment as a general remedial measure) would be unjust, as it would 
leave families without a remedy in instances where a school dis-
trict had determined that a child did not meet IDEA criteria and 
had not developed an IEP for the child. 100 
In the final analysis, Rowley and the tuition reimbursement 
line of decisions interpreted IDEA in a manner that preferenced 
IDEA's procedural requirements and abstract standards concern-
ing access over the equality-based intent of the law. 101 The rulings 
in both areas yield somewhat ambiguous standards, 102 leaving 
considerable "unguided power" in the hands of lower courts. 103 
From an educational equity perspective, the Supreme Court's ex-
cessively narrow "some benefit" standard for defining special 
needs services and its broadly construed opportunities for tuition 
reimbursement coalesce to form a legacy of significant disregard 
for the disparate impact of such rulings on individuals with spe-
cific disability profiles. 
TUITION REIMBURSEMENT-INVITING SIGNIFICANT 
DEPARTURES FROM EQUALITY GOALS 
Beyond its marginalizing impact, tuition reimbursement case 
law invites a chaotic and equity-compromising matrix of practical 
barriers and cultural biases to challenge families-particularly 
those of limited means-in their ability to advocate for their spe-
cial needs children. This part examines specific factors the tui-
tion reimbursement process that materially compromise IDEA's 
equality goals and contribute to an opportunity discrepancy free-
fall within the population served. 
100. Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 244-45; see Sheon, supra note 32, at 616. 
101. See Joanne Karger, A New Perspective on Schaffer v. Weast: Using a Social-
Relations Approach to Determine the Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Special Educa-
tion Due Process Hearings, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 133, 177 n.198 (2008). 
102. See Kocher, supra note 64, at 352 (discussing that the ambiguity in Rowley con-
cerns assessing the threshold for appropriate educational services); Lennon, supra note 32, 
at 1315-16 (discussing that the ambiguity in Forest Grove concerns how courts should 
weigh the equities of a unilateral private placement case to determine reduction or allow-
ance of tuition reimbursement and noting that, despite the limited guidance in Forest 
Grove itself as to how district courts should weigh equities in tuition reimbursement cases, 
"IDEA includes limiting circumstances that, if present in a case, guide the court in reduc-
ing, or even eliminating, a reimbursement award"). Additionally, IDEA fails to provide 
definitive instructions on the extent to which a court may reduce an award or what man-
ner of parental conduct will provoke reduction or loss of reimbursement. See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2012). 
103. Lennon, supra note 32, at 1315. 
'! 
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The Supreme Court's tuition reimbursement cases build on 
IDEA's commitment to provide education designed to meet disa-
bled students' needs104 and to protect their rights to such services 
through equitable remedies. 105 However, tuition reimbursement 
also has vast policy implications that are largely out of sync with 
IDEA's fundamental equality goals and equity principles. 106 More 
than any other IDEA provision, private school tuition reim-
bursement has introduced a structural and procedural bias into 
special education resourcing. This bias disproportionately bene-
fits special needs children from high socioeconomic groups, while 
marginalizing students from lower socioeconomic groups in terms 
of the instructional resources and settings available to them.107 
A. Creating a Means-Based Bias 
Perhaps the most complicating factor of IDEA, and the one 
with the most direct potential to compromise service equality, is 
the differential access to the parental tuition reimbursement 
remedy. 108 While the Supreme Court's broad reading of IDEA's 
equitable remedies in tuition reimbursement cases could poten-
tially advantage special needs students from all backgrounds, the 
rulings particularly privilege families with sufficient means to as-
sume the substantial financial risk of "fronting" private school tu-
ition payments in the hope of reimbursement. 109 A majority of 
families with students eligible for ID EA services are economically 
challenged110 and are unlikely to be able to take advantage of this 
104. See, e.g., Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 239 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Mass. 
Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 367 (1985)). In its Forest Grove ruling, the Supreme Court 
noted that the Burlington and Carter cases involved children for whom school districts had 
offered inadequate special education plans and services, in contrast to T.A., the affected 
child in this case, for whom the school district had failed to offer special education or re-
lated services altogether. Id. at 238. However, the Court found these distinctions "insignif-
icant" in light of the controlling IDEA language and due to the practical consideration that 
"a school district's failure to propose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious a violation of 
its responsibilities under IDEA as a failure to provide an adequate IEP." Id. at 23&--39. 
105. Blumberg, supra note 88, at 1 73. 
106. Id. at 176. 
107. See Hyman et al., supra note 40, at 121. 
108. See Cari Carson, Note, Rethinking Special Education's "Least Restrictive Envi-
ronment" Requirement, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1397, 1406 (2015). 
109. See Blumberg, supra note 88, at 176. 
110. See Hyman et al., supra note 40, at 112-13 (explaining that of the almost seven 
million children receiving services under the IDEA, most come from families of limited 
resources and that approximately two million of the eligible children live below the pov-
erty line). Nearly 20% of the IDEA-served population lives in households with an annual 
2016] FROMJ\i 
• 111 D G option. r orest 
thus invite a grosi 
of equitable remec 
B. Undermining l 
Litigation 
At the core of l 
tended to suppor1 
parents to develoi: 
structional altern: 
education appropi 
framework presun 
opportunity to de1 
propriate before tl 
ternative instructi 
To the extent tl 
placement and ele 
public school spec 
ti on of ID EA in F( 
dermines the prer 
design and manag 
somewhat oversta 
findings that must 
IDEA, 117 it is nonet 
income of $15,000 or less. 
111. Blumberg, supra 
with the "inferior remedy 
limitations of compensate 
area). 
112. Blumberg, supra 
113. See Schaffer v. w, 
114. See Brief for Nat' 
11, Forest Grove Sch. Dis 
at 622. 
115. See Brief for Nat 
Note, Public School Oblig 
in Forest Grove School D 
419-20 (2009). 
116. See Sheon, supra 
pra note 114, at 22 (notin, 
IDEA also "allows, and ev 
even try to obtain an IEP'' 
117. Forest Grove inch 
equitable considerations a 
EW [Vol. 50:951 
at cases build on 
;ned to meet disa-
ts to such services 
m reimbursement 
y out of sync with 
principles. 106 More 
ool tuition reim-
xedural bias into 
)Ortionately bene-
mic groups, while 
ic groups in terms 
ible to them.107 
1 EA, and the one 
ervice equality, is 
n reimbursement 
·eading of IDEA's 
ases could poten-
backgrounds, the 
~ient means to as-
private school tu-
.109 A majority of 
; are economically 
advantage of this 
1. of Burlington v. Mass. 
ing, the Supreme Court 
horn school districts had 
ast to T.A., the affected 
special education or re-
se distinctions "insignif-
ctical consideration that 
as serious a violation of 
IEP." Id. at 238--39. 
"Least Restrictive Envi-
b.at of the almost seven 
rom families of limited 
.ren live below the pov-
seholds with an annual 
2016] FROM MAINSTREAMING TO MARGINALIZATION? 969 
option. 111 Forest Grove and its predecessor reimbursement rulings 
invite a gross imbalance the practical availability and use 
of equitable remedies. 112 
B. Undermining JDEA's Cooperative Paradigm and Promoting 
Litigation 
At the core of IDEA is an elaborate collaborative process, in-
tended to support good faith negotiations between schools and 
parents to develop IEPs for disabled children113 and to identify 
structional alternatives if the school's plan does not achieve an 
education appropriate to a child's needs. 114 IDEA's cooperative 
framework presumes that educators and parents will have a full 
opportunity to determine whether a school district's plan is ap-
propriate before the parents withdraw the child favor of an al-
ternative instructional environment. 115 
To the extent that parents have the means to pursue private 
placement and elect to do so without first exposing their child to 
public school special education resources, the Court's interpreta-
tion of IDEA in Forest Grove disincentivizes cooperation and un-
dermines the premise that parents and educators should jointly 
design and manage education plans. 116 While this concern may be 
somewhat overstated in light of the substantive and equitable 
findings that must support a tuition reimbursement award under 
IDEA,117 it is nonetheless reasonable to attribute to Forest Grove a 
income of $15,000 or less. Id. at 113. 
111. Blumberg, supra note 88, at 176 (noting that less advantaged students will be left 
with the "inferior remedy of compensatory education"); see infra Part V.C (discussing the 
limitations of compensatory education and advocating for enhancements to this remedial 
area). 
112. Blumberg, supra note 88, at 178. 
113. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53 (2005); H.R. REP. No. 105-95, at 82 (1997). 
114. See Brief for Nat'l Sch. Eds. Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
11, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009) (No. 08-305); Sheon, supra note 32, 
at 622. 
115. See Brief for Nat'l Sch. Eds. Ass'n et al., supra note 114, at 11; E. Chaney Hall, 
Note, Public School Obligations to Pay Private School Tuition: Reinterpreting the I.D.E.A. 
in Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. PoL'Y SIDEBAR 409, 
419-20 (2009). 
116. See Shean, supra note 32, at 622; see also Brief for Nat'l Sch. Bds. Ass'n et al., su-
pra note 114, at 22 (noting that at the appellate level, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of 
IDEA also "allows, and even encourages, parents and their attorneys to sit back and never 
even try to obtain an IEP"). 
117. Forest Grove included language suggesting that a court should take into account 
equitable considerations about the parents' engagement with the school district to develop 
970 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:951 
legacy that encourages an adversarial culture in IDEA implemen-
tation.118 
C. Undermining IDEA's Inclusion Preference 
When enacting IDEA, Congress acknowledged the parallel 
principles of disabled childrens' right to educational opportunities 
and their right to receive those opportunities in an integrated set-
ting with non-disabled students.119 Consistent with this premise, 
IDEA's least restrictive environment preference encourages 
greater access for disabled children to mainstream classrooms or 
other inclusive settings. 120 
Research on inclusion practices121 supports the view that the 
paired goals of individual educational achievement and associa-
tion with non-disabled peers mutually support strong outcomes in 
special needs service delivery.122 The benefits of integrated learn-
ing environments for minority and socioeconomically disadvan-
taged disabled students, in particular, are especially strong.123 To 
an educational plan for their child before exercising the unilateral private placement op-
tion, making it appear highly unlikely that a court would favorably rule on a tuition reim-
bursement petition if a parent had not attempted to cooperate with the school district to 
procure educational resources for a child before removal to a private alternative. See 
Kocher, supra note 64, at 354 ("As Forest Grove clarifies, in a hearing for reimbursement, 
judges must consider the level of cooperation between the school and parents when award-
ing damages. As a result, only meritorious claims will result in damage awards. This gives 
parents an incentive to cooperate with school districts to attain appropriate services before 
unilaterally placing their child into a private placement."). The Court noted that "[p]arents 
'are entitled to reimbursement only if a federal court concludes both that the public 
placement violated IDEA and the private school placement was proper under the Act."' 
Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 246 (2009) (quoting Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. 
Four v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 15 (1993)). But see Sheon, supra note 32, at 622 (positing that 
Forest Grove "permits parents to remove their child from the public-school environment 
and to obtain public funds to finance a private education without ever working with the 
public school"). 
118. See infra Part IV.A. 
119. See DeMonte, supra note 49, at 161-62, 165 (discussing background that led to the 
enactment of IDEA). 
120. See supra Part I.A; see also infra Part III.B (discussing least restrictive environ-
ment). 
121. IDEA expresses an intent for inclusive education, but requires that children with 
disabilities be educated in the least restrictive environment without specifically indicating 
a preference for any educational method to assure this. See 2,0 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A) 
(2012). Thus, the term "inclusion" is used categorically in this comment without the intent 
to specify any particular method of integrating the disabled student into the general edu-
cation setting. 
122. Jennifer M. Saba, Comment, Undue Deference: Toward a Dual System of Burdens 
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 133, 149 (2007). 
123. See Crockett, supra note 12, at 546; see also Saba, supra note 122, at 149-50. But 
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the extent that tuition reimbursement facilitates the removal of 
special needs students from inclusive instructional settings and 
into private programs targeted to particular disabilities or service 
needs, there is reason for concern that the equality outcomes of 
integrated learniJ?-g will suffer. 
Although tuition reimbursement may reduce reliance on inclu-
sive public instructional settings, it does not necessarily adverse-
ly impact educational quality for disabled students. Increasingly, 
school district resourcing decisions demonstrate a lack of com-
mitment to inclusion, considering it a costly and ineffective alter-
native.124 Research suggests that, at least in some circumstances, 
segregated placements may be educationally preferable for disa-
bled students. 125 Some go so far as to argue that "IDEA promotes 
inclusion as a civil right, despite very weak data supporting it as 
a 'best practice' many students with disabilities."126 Therefore, 
integrated learning environments for special needs students are 
not universally preferred-either by educators or parents in 
IDEA deliberations. 127 Although the tuition reimbursement reme-
dy on its face has been challenged as a measure that encourages 
segregation and undermines IDEA's own least restrictive envi-
ronment requirement, 128 it is important to note that rigid adher-
ence to integrated learning settings can mistakenly place "em-
phasis on inclusion over instruction .... "129 
see infra Part III.B (discussing conflicting perspectives on the value on inclusion in disabil-
ity education). 
124. While the common wisdom is that inclusive placements for disabled students are 
more cost-effective than segregated environments, this presumption may not fully account 
for the supplemental services and other costs required to render a general education envi-
ronment conducive to integrated learning by disabled and non-disabled students. See, e.g., 
Perna, supra note 25, at 564-65 (discussing the various accommodations or modifications 
necessary to maintain the placement of a special needs student in a general classroom and 
to make inclusion work). 
125. Ferri & Conner, supra note 6, at 467; see also Perna, supra note 25, at 559 (noting 
the trend of "overreferral and overplacement in restrictive settings" and attributing this 
pattern to factors such as a chronic lack of support services in general education settings 
to accommodate integration of disabled students and state aid incentives that encourage 
restrictive placements). 
126. Perna, supra note 25, at 563-64. Nonetheless, most disabled students are educat-
ed in inclusive settings and receive general education services and resources, supplement-
ed by special education support as directed by their IEPs. Id. at 555. 
127. See Michael L. Perlin, "Simplify You, Classify You''.· Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil 
Rights in Disability Classification Systems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 618 (2009); infra 
Part III.B. 
128. See Carson, supra note 108, at 1405-06. 
129. Crockett, supra note 12, at 544. 
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Nothing in this critique of Forest Grove's potentially adverse 
impact on IDEA's inclusion preference detracts from the very real 
possibility that a segregated private instructional setting may be 
the most reasonable, and even the least restrictive, environment 
for a disabled child's needs. 130 Indeed, there is no certainty that a 
private placement for a disabled student necessarily means that 
the student is in a segregated instructional environment with on-
ly similarly disabled children. 131 
Nonetheless, Forest Grove's broad parameters encouraging al-
ternative placement in private settings contradict the procedural 
underpinnings of IDEA, anticipating that any decision to segre-
gate a disabled child in a special educational environment will oc-
cur only after the collaborative best efforts of educators and par-
ents have demonstrated that a more inclusive public setting with 
appropriate support services is not reasonable. 132 Thus, a paradox 
is embedded in the interplay of IDEA and Forest Grove-while 
providing parents (at least those with means) increased options in 
selecting their child's special education environment, the tuition 
reimbursement alternative may also contribute to resegregation 
of disabled children in private, special needs settings. 133 
Adverse Equality Implications for Special Education 
Resourcing 
In analyzing Forest Grove's potential for disrupting the equali-
ty premise of special education, it is important to keep in mind 
that resourcing special education is a zero sum game. With finite 
130. See Sheon, supra note 32, at 623. 
131. See JANET R. BEALES & THOMAS F. BERTONNEAU, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. 
POLICY, DO PRNATE SCHOOLS SERVE DIFFICULT-TO-EDUCATE STUDENTS? ANALYSIS AND 
MICHIGAN CASE STUDIES OF How NONGOVERNMENT SCHOOLS EDUCATE DISABLED, AT-
RISK, AND INCARCERATED YOUTH 25 (1997), https://www.mackinac.org/archives/1997/s 
1997-03.pdf ("More research is needed about the impact of full inclusion on student per-
formance, and the extent to which regular private schools accommodate students with dis-
abilities."); Shanon S. Taylor, Special Education, Private Schools, and Vouchers: Do All 
Students Get a Choice?, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 23 (2005) ("Information on the special educa-
tion practices of private schools is needed on a large scale."). 
132. See T.R. v. Kingwood Twp. Bd. of Educ., 205 F.3d 572, 577 (3d Cir. 2000); Sheon, 
supra note 32, at 623 ("Under the IDEA, the school district and the parents should con-
template segregation of a child with disabilities only if, after best efforts, the inclusion is 
not reasonable."). 
133. See Lennon, supra note 32, at 1299; see also Perna, supra note 25, at 565 (noting 
that parents most frequently litigated under IDEA to remove their disabled child from an 
inclusive public setting to a private special education school that educates only disabled 
students and offers no inclusion). 
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and consistently stretched funding available to school districts for 
special education, any measure that facilitates private school 
placements will generally impact the resources available for edu-
cational program delivery.134 To the extent that the private educa-
tion alternatives, made more broadly available by Forest Grove 
are utilized disproportionately by families relative means, the 
equality imbalance becomes even more apparent.135 
Under the best of fiscal circumstances, extreme cost disparities 
remain between private and public school systems to educate dis-
abled students. 136 The average per student expenditure for in-
struction in a private special education program approaches five 
times that of the average per student cost a public school envi-
ronment.137 When private tuition reimbursement involves stu-
dents who have not previously received public education services, 
the fiscal impact is particularly adverse because schools have no 
reliable mechanism for calculating costs when they cannot rea-
sonably anticipate private placement eligibility and demand pat-
terns.138 
134. See Brief of the Council of the Great City Schs. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 3-4, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009) (No. 08-305); Hall, supra 
note 115, at 420. 
135. See infra Part IV.B. 
136. There has not been a definitive study comparing the frequency or fiscal impact of 
post-Forest Grove tuition reimbursement awards with tuition reimbursement awards prior 
to the Forest Grove's expansive reading of the IDEA tuition reimbursement option. Most 
research concerning the outcome of tuition reimbursement rulings was conducted prior to 
completion of the Supreme Court's full series of tuition reimbursement rulings in Burling-
ton through Forest Grove. See Harrison, supra note 39, at 900-01 (reporting that at least 
one study has documented that although "the number of court decisions concerning special 
education has increased," the percentage of rulings favoring parents has not appreciably 
changed since the inception of IDEA in 1975, and that a follow up study revealed no sta-
tistically significant change in the outcome distribution of published tuition reimburse-
ment decisions in the wake of Burlington and Carter, further noting that those decisions 
had not made courts more inclined to rule in favor of parents). Despite the scarcity of cur-
rent statistical data to confirm the impact of expansive judicial readings of IDEA's tuition 
reimbursement provision, it is important to note that some educational commentators 
maintain that Forest Grove will reach a relatively narrow category of case, and therefore 
will not have the fiscally adverse impact projected by its critics. See, e.g., Kocher, supra 
note 64, at 348-50 (arguing that Forest Grove was an "illusory win for parents" because its 
actual impact is limited by the significant number of requirements parents must continue 
to meet under IDEA). 
137. Sheon, supra note 32, at 624; see also Lennon, supra note 32, at 1320 (discussing 
findings that school districts are not prevailing in tuition reimbursement legal actions at 
an overwhelming rate over parent litigants, thus indicating that the financial strain on 
public schools as a result of Forest Grove may be greater than anticipated). 
138. Sheon, supra note 32, at 624. 
i 
I 
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The reality is that private tuition reimbursement expenditures 
by school districts will not occur the best of fiscal circumstanc-
es by any measure. Funding shortfalls under IDEA occur peren-
nially in all jurisdictions.139 School districts must confront the fis-
cal reality that any service delivery, accommodation, or private 
placement decision that benefits one student necessarily is subsi-
dized by funds that would otherwise bring special needs resources 
to another disabled child who remains behind in the public spe-
cial education setting. 14° Further, private placement decisions 
may provoke other families-statistically most likely those of 
higher socioeconomic standing141-to advocate for comparable 
benefits, exponentially increasing the fiscal impact of such deci-
• 142 
SlOnS. 
Although the expansive judicial reading of tuition reimburse-
ment options clearly introduces a means-based bias into the in-
structional resources available to special needs children, the equi-
ty-compromising consequences of unrestrained private placement 
subsidies under IDEA are far more vast. Tuition reimbursement 
solutions to deficiencies in special education service delivery, if 
not judiciously exercised, offer the prospect for detracting from 
the very features of IDEA that were intended to serve and bal-
ance the interests of all special needs students-cooperatively de-
veloped and fully mediated education plans, appropriately inclu-
sive instructional environments, and balanced resourcing of 
special and general educational services. 
III. SOCIAL NORMS AND EDUCATIONAL FACTORS INFLUENCING 
IDEA EQUALITY GOALS 
The distinct departures from IDEA's equality foundations en-
couraged by tuition reimbursement already examined here have 
been exacerbated by social norms that encourage de facto segre-
139. See infra Part V.A. But see Perna, supra note 25, at 556 (noting that "[a]ccurate 
accounting of spending on the state, district, and school level for special education does not 
exist"). 
140. See Judith DeBerry, Comment, V\-'hen Parents and Educators Clash: Are Special 
Education Students Entitled to a Cadillac Education?, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 503, 507 (2003). 
141. See infra Part IV.B. ' 
142. See DeBerry, supra note 140, at 507 ("[S]chool districts must also face the reality 
that if they provide one student with specific accommodations, other students will want 
the same benefit. In an effort to control costs, school districts must balance the value and 
effectiveness of a given service for an individual student against the cost of the service and 
the likelihood other students may demand the same service."). 
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gation disabled students and, further, by conflicting education-
al views on inclusive approaches to special needs instruction. Be-
fore identifying measures to restore equality to special education 
service delivery, 143 it is important to understand the social context 
and educational ,inclusion constructs that inform and challenge 
corrective efforts. The following discussion examines critical in-
fluences in this regard. 
A. Racially Differentiated Use of Special Education 
Since Brown, racialized notions of ability have become so cul-
turally entrenched that separating disabled students for instruc-
tion has actual racial segregation consequences. 144 Recent studies 
support the view that being identified as disabled results in vast-
ly disparate outcomes for white students as compared to students 
of color. 145 White students identified as disabled are more likely to 
receive access to supplemental classroom support services, but by 
contrast, a disability label for students of color is more likely to 
result in decreased access to general education settings, separa-
tion in specialized classrooms out of the mainstream, or place-
ment in isolated facilities, even when the students do not require 
intensive supplemental services. 146 As a result, disability labelling 
has developed into a more socially acceptable marginalization 
category for students of color, producing a covert form of racial 
segregation premised on special education practices.147 
143. See infra Part V. 
144. See Ferri & Connor, supra note 6, at 454; Nicole M. Oelrich, A New "IDEA''.· End-
ing Racial Disparity in the Identification of Students with Emotional Disturbance, 57 S.D . 
L. REV. 9, 22 (2012) (noting that after factoring both race and gender into the comparative 
equation, African American males are six times more likely than white females to be iden-
tified by schools as having emotional disturbance under IDEA). 
145. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., A NEW ERA: 
REVITALIZING SPECIAL EDUCATION FOR CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 26 (2002). 
146. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., 27TH ANNuAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT, VOL. 1, at 48 
(2005); Ferri & Connor, supra note 6, at 458-59. But see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination 
Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415, 1463 (2007) (conceding 
that while there is legitimate reason to be concerned about the overrepresentation of Afri-
can American male students in "dead end" self-contained special education classrooms, 
limited resources, rather than the segregated nature of these classrooms, may be the 
cause). 
147. See Ferri & Connor, supra note 6, at 454. 
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In sum, disability labels continue to further exclude historically 
marginalized minority students in special education settings. 148 
Special education, despite its design to meet the learning needs of 
diverse groups, has been used to segregate individuals based on 
interconnected, yet highly conflated, notions of race and educa-
tional ability.149 To the extent that such practices derive from sys-
temic cultural biases am~mg teachers, they represent a particu-
larly sensitive area for concern in evaluating the social climate 
adversely impacting IDEA's equality goals. 150 
B. Conflicting Perspectives on Value of Inclusion in Disability 
Education 
School districts and courts may have strayed away from equali-
ty by broadly accommodating tuition reimbursement remedies, 
but it is important not to over-correct when addressing the inclu-
sion consequences of such policies. Although IDEA has produced 
a substantial body of legal discourse based on the integration 
preference, many educators caution against assuming the superi-
ority of integrated learning environments. 151 
As concerns grew regarding the stigma and reduced expecta-
tions associated with segregated special needs settings, the inclu-
sion principle found its way into IDEA. 152 Some educational schol-
ars suggest that separate instructional settings for disabled 
students have a labeling and stigmatizing impact that violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantees, par-
ticularly when the racial overrepresentation factors in such set-
tings are considered. 153 
Concerns about the potentially stigmatizing impact of a special 
needs designation, and even more so segregation in a special edu-
cation learning environment, should not be discounted. However, 
an overly simplistic reading of legal and judicial demands for in-
clusion may "miscalibrate the balance between equality and jus-
tice" and inappropriately preference integration over educational 
148. Id. at 459 (noting that, conversely, gifted labels denoting special academic abilities 
have permitted schools to "protectively segregate certain classes of White students"). 
149. Id. at 461. 
150. See Oelrich, supra note 144, at 27, 32. 
151. See Colker, supra note 146, at 1430 (2007). 
152. See DeMonte, supra note 49, at 171. 
153. See Marcia C. Arceneaux, The System and the Label of Special Education: Is It a 
Constitutional Issue?, 32 S.U. L. REV. 225, 233 (2005). 
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quality goals. 154 An inappropriate placement in the regular class-
room does not afford equal educational opportunities if it does not 
adequately serve the student. 155 
fact, considerable confusion surrounds what a special educa-
tion learning environment is restricting in the first place. 156 Pri-
vate special needs instructional settings should not be presumed 
all circumstances to isolate the disabled and to produce ad-
verse academic and social consequences on par with the invidious 
segregation at issue in Brown. 157 Substantial research documents 
that efforts to integrate disabled students into general education-
al settings may not optimize learning opportunities in all circum-
stances.158 Placement decisions should resolve the logical tension 
as to whether a segregated learning setting enhances educational 
opportunity for disabled students or deprives them of valuable so-
cial integration with their non-disabled peers. 
Advocating for more highly nuanced assessments of special 
needs segregating practices, disability education scholar Ruth 
Colker urges a move beyond the mantra "separate is inherently 
unequal" and toward a more sophisticated understanding of sepa-
ration and inequality in special education service delivery. 159 
Colker argues that separation of disabled students into learning 
environments targeted to their disabilities "need not result in 
equality if . . . accompanied by adequate services and positive 
recognition; it need not be the equivalent of invidious segrega-
tion."160 She cautions that overemphasis on the degree of integra-
tion in special education service delivery actually may deflect ap-
propriate focus from the quality of services provided. 161 
154. Colker, supra note 146, at 1483. 
155. See id. 
156. Crockett, supra note 12, at 563. 
157. See Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 
U. PA. L. REV. 789, 796 (2006) (arguing that the integration presumption has led school 
districts to presumptively favor educating disabled children in regular classrooms over 
other educational configurations such as pull-out programs, resource rooms, or segregated 
special education classes and questioning the advisability of this approach as hindering 
educational development in some instances). 
158. See, e.g., Crockett, supra note 12, at 562 (suggesting that under certain circum-
stances, mainstreaming and inclusion practices may expose disabled students to a differ-
ent, but very real, type of segregation-the exclusion from a basic right to learn because 
they do not have the ability to keep pace with the curriculum in the manner it is struc-
tured in the general education classroom). 
159. Colker, supra note 146, at 1420, 1422. 
160. Id. at 1420. 
161. Id. at 1463. 
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In regards to the equality-compromising impact of tuition re-
imbursement, the presumed stigmatizing consequences associat-
ed with segregated learning environments may be undergoing 
somewhat of a reversal. Although dedicated learning environ-
ments for the disabled and segregation of students with different 
disabilities in settings targeted to their conditions have historical-
ly been equated with stigma, competing educational theories sup-
port the view that segregated private instructional options may in 
fact help reduce that stigma in certain instances. 162 Educators and 
parents often believe that students thrive in instructional envi-
ronments exclusively for peers with similar disabilities and chal-
lenges.163 Because mainstreaming and inclusion practices may in-
troduce their own differentiating and segregating consequences, 
there is merit in shielding disabled students from lack of ac-
ceptance by non-disabled classmates.164 This may, turn, allow 
them to address their challenges greater privacy and empa-
thy in an alternative setting.165 
Ultimately, any indictment of segregating practices in special 
education should be tempered by recognizing the fundamental 
distinction between disability and race as concerns the strength 
of the inclusion preference. In the case of disability, there may be 
compelling reasons for differentiating the instructional methods 
and setting for a special needs child or even removing that child 
from the regular educational setting altogether. 166 Evaluating the 
issue of tuition reimbursement for special needs programs in pri-
vate settings purely from an integration bias perspective mistak-
enly overlooks the fact that such segregated options actually may 
reduce stigma and enhance learning. Federal law, judicial inter-
pretations, and any measures proposed to restore equity to spe-
cial education service delivery should remain focused on provid-
162. Id. at 1470. 
163. See, e.g., Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ. of Mass., 736 F.2d 773, 789 (1st Cir. 
1984). 
164. See Perlin, supra note 127, at 618 (discussing case law that supports the view that 
there are negative side effects of mainstreaming, such as suggesting that a child may suf-
fer interpersonally if unable to keep pace with non-disabled peers). 
165. See Colker, supra note 146, at 1470. 
166. Colker, supra note 157, at 820. But see Mark C. Weber, Response, A Nuanced Ap-
proach to the Disability Integration Presumption, 156 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 174, 174-75 
(2007), http://www.pennlawreview.com/online/163-U-Pa-L-Rev-Online-61.pdf (addressing 
Colker's position and advocating for a response to parental and school district resistance to 
integration focusing on intensity of services to facilitate success in mainstreaming disa-
bled students in integrated settings). 
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ing disabled students the configuration of resources and services 
appropriate to their individual needs. This will ensure that the 
quality of education, rather than the degree of integration, is the 
measure of success. 167 
' IV. IDEA'S STRUCTURAL AND IMPLEMENTATION FLAWS 
COMPROMISING EQUALITY 
Beyond the social and educational norms inform special 
needs service delivery, the equality premise of IDEA also contin-
ues to be challenged and undermined by structural flaws in the 
statute's private enforcement provisions that create inequitable 
power imbalances. 168 Various structural features of IDEA estab-
lish a paradigm for both school and parent engagement premised 
on unrealistic and unworkable presumptions about parental ac-
cess and resource factors. While commendable in its collaborative 
aspirations, this framework disproportionately marginalizes fam-
ilies without financial resources. 169 
A. Parent "Capture" in Adversarial Personal Enforcement 
Procedures 
Despite the structural premise of IDEA that parents and 
schools will collaboratively oversee a child's educational plan, the 
law actually puts in place an awkward, often unworkable para-
digm where parents, as enforcers and advocates for their chil-
dren, necessarily are postured opposition against the school 
district. 170 Although initially envisioned as a means ofleveling the 
educational services playing field for disabled children, the stat-
ute fosters a virtually irreconcilable tension between parents 
seeking the best possible services for their special needs child and 
educators seeking to provide the best possible education for all 
students. 111 
167. Cf. Colker, supra note 146, at 1464. 
168. See Valverde, supra note 23, at 619. 
169. Hyman et al., supra note 40, at 112-15. 
170. Perna, supra note 25, at 561-62. 
171. LaDonna L. Boeckman, Note, Bestowing the Key to Public Education: The Effects 
of Judicial Determinations of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act on Disabled 
and Nondisabled Students, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 855, 880 (1998). 
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In casting parents in an advocacy role that often requires ad-
versarial duties, IDEA presents fundamental barriers that limit 
the success of this relational model. 112 To begin, as compared with 
school districts, parents have informational challenges concerning 
diagnostic criteria for special needs identification, educational 
programs, and available support services. 173 Perhaps even more 
challenging, once parents assume advocacy roles, they become 
captives in a system that requires them to navigate complex pro-
cedural requirements and confront school officials with special-
ized expertise, all the while doing so without compromising rela-
tionships that must continue for the duration of their child's 
educational career.174 
IDEA has been resoundingly criticized for the inequities pre-
sented by its attenuated and complex due process protections. 175 
Although intended to support the Act's goal of encouraging open 
communication between educators and parents, these procedural 
requirements are "practically indecipherable without legal assis-
tance, and the likelihood of prevailing is remote without expert 
witness testimony."176 While the Act on its face accords parents 
and school districts procedural safeguards, vast discrepancies ex-
ist in the parties' respective capacities to avail themselves of such 
protections. 177 This imbalance subverts IDEA's concept of partner-
ing to identify special needs services. 178 
Rowley's relatively low "some benefit" standard for establishing 
service entitlements under IDEA gives school districts a distinct 
upper hand in due process hearings and litigation involving spe-
cial needs placements. In virtually every ID EA hearing, parents 
bear the burden of proof as the party initiating action and the 
172. Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren't Enough: External Advocacy in Special 
Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1828 (2008). 
173. Id. 
17 4. Id. at 1828-29; see also Cali Cope-Kasten, Comment, Bidding (Fair )well to Due 
Process: The Need for a Fairer Final Stage in Special Education Dispute Resolution, 42 
J.L. & EDUC. 501, 516-17 (2013) (stating that "the effects of a poisoned relationship are 
often most severe for the student" and can impede development of subsequent IEPs and 
escalate conflict in future educational placement negotiations). 
175. Kocher, supra note 64, at 350, 352. 
176. Id. at 350. 
177. Cope-Kasten, supra note 174, at 526. 
178. Kevin D. Hill, Legal Conflicts in Special Education: How Competing Paradigms in 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act Create Litigation, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 129, 
147 (1986). 
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party seeking change in an IEP or alternative placement. 179 Fur-
thermore, studies of state-level education hearings identify rela-
tively few rulings favoring educational methods or placement al-
ternatives other than those proposed or use by the school 
district. 180 
Clearly, there is an inevitable disparity between school dis-
tricts replete with resources and experience to support their de-
fense and parents who lack resources or experience. 181 beyond 
the inherent expertise and relational challenges most parents 
face, there are also legal representation and cost factors that dis-
proportionately impact parents with fewer resources and lower 
levels of education.182 Under IDEA's adversarial paradigm, legal 
representation is one of the most significant determinants suc-
cess in advocating for special education services. 183 But the cost of 
legal representation invites the reality that wealthy parents are 
able to exercise private enforcement more frequently and more 
successfully than lower-income parents. 184 
The pervasive shortage of free or low -cost legal services in spe-
cial education matters forces parents to proceed without legal 
representation or hire an attorney at their own expense, leaving 
no effective alternative to those with limited means who seek to 
advocate for their child. 185 Although attorney representation is not 
required at IDEA due process hearings, the complexity of such 
proceedings pose considerable obstacles to parents lacking legal 
counsel. 186 Their circumstances are further complicated by IDEA 
regulations that exclude non-attorney advocates from serving as 
179. Cope-Kasten, supra note 174, at 520-21; see also Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 
51 (2005) (holding that the burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an 
IEP rests with the party seeking relief, unless the burden is shifted by operation of state 
law). 
180. See Laura C. Henry, Note, Crippling the Education for All Handicapped Children 
Act, 12 STETSON L. REV. 791, 811 (1983). Further evidence of the impediments parents en-
counter in exercising the enforcement rights under IDEA's due process procedures is found 
in the stunningly low use of said procedures. See Hyman et al., supra note 40, at 120 
("[O]ut of almost seven million children receiving special education services through 
IDEA ... only 2,033 families participated in hearings that resulted in a final decision."). 
181. Cope-Kasten, supra note 174, at 526. 
182. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 172, at 1833. 
183. See, e.g., MELANIE ARCHER, ACCESS AND EQUITY IN THE DUE PROCESS SYSTEM: 
ATTORNEY REPRESENTATION AND HEARING OUTCOMES IN ILLINOIS 1997-2002, at 7 (2002), 
http://www.dueprocessillinois.org/Access.pdf. 
184. Valverde, supra note 23, at 623. 
185. See Blumberg, supra note 88, at 178. 
186. See id. 
I 
11 
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parental representatives absent state law provisions authorizing 
them to do so. 187 
The extent to which due process hearings or litigation require 
parents to aggressively support their claims with expensive diag-
nostic testing, expert witnesses, and other supporting evidence to 
counter school district findings cannot be overstated. 188 These 
burdens are further exacerbated by a Supreme Court ruling pre-
ceding Forest Grove that denied expert witness fees to prevailing 
parents in IDEA litigation.189 
Cumulatively, these dynamics introduce a persistent inequity 
theme into IDEA private enforcement: higher quality and more 
responsive special education services tend to be provided to privi-
leged students whose parents can assume the expected advocacy 
roles and costs. 190 Introducing an even more egregious slant on 
the inequitable enforcement playing field, school districts may 
strategically contain special education expenses by considering 
the socioeconomic status of disabled students as a predictor of 
their likelihood of legal representation and, thus, successful pur-
suit of IDEA remedies. 191 Employing this calculus invites a prac-
tice in some districts of "limiting or reducing services for those 
with the quietest voices."192 
In sum, the burdens of advocating for special educational ser-
vices-whether in a private setting or otherwise-clearly present 
hurdles to most families and outright barriers to those without 
187. See C.F.R. § 300.512(a)(l) (2015) (stating that any party to a hearing has the right 
to be accompanied and advised by counsel and individuals with special knowledge or 
training relating to children with disabilities, but whether parties have the right to be 
represented by non-attorneys at due process hearings is determined by state law). 
188. Boeckman, supra note 171, at 876 ("[I]t is often only after testing, diagnosis, lob-
bying schools for placement, working through the creation of an IEP, monitoring to meas-
ure the success or effectiveness of the program, making certain all the steps of the pro-
gram are carried out, and hiring an attorney to challenge the IEP, that a system is created 
[to support personal enforcement under IDEA]. It is a system that favors those parents 
that have the time and money to hire someone to represent their position and get either 
expensive medical testing or expert testimony 'to make certain a school district lives up to 
its responsibilities under the IDEA."'). 
189. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 293-94 
(2006). Of the 7 million children estimated to be receiving special education services under 
IDEA, approximately 36% are from households with incomes under $25,000 and 32% are 
from households with incomes between $25,000 and $50,000. Kocher, supra note 64, at 
351. 
190. See Valverde, supra note 23, at 619. 
191. See id. at 622-23. 
192. Id. at 623. 
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means. 193 Although IDEA affords all parents legal rights, it dis-
proportionately confronts families of limited means with expen-
sive, 194 time-intensive, resourcing challenges beyond the virtually 
insurmountable burdens195 required to prevail on the merits an 
IDEA action. 196 A disturbing corollary to this reality is IDEA's 
herent paradox that more affluent families are the primary force 
holding schools accountable, while families without means are 
marginalized as both advocates for, and beneficiaries of, special 
education services. 197 
B. Inequitable Structural Norms of Private Enforcement 
Mechanisms 
While there is no comprehensive research presenting a defini-
tive means-based metric of IDEA private enforcement, the Act's 
enforcement mechanisms reveal a problematic, equality-defeating 
pattern that limits the utility of such devices for those without 
means. 198 Means-linked private enforcement disparities inform 
any credible analysis of departures from special education equali-
ty goals and equity principles. Although Congress intended IDEA 
to serve as a universal, rather than means-based, program, its in-
193. Such barriers become an exceptional equality-compromising concern when the so-
cioeconomic statistics are examined-parents of special needs children tend to earn less 
than parents of non-disabled children. See Kocher, supra note 64, at 351. 
194. In this context, it is also important not to lose sight of the overall expenses of 
IDEA litigation-to school districts, as well as families, and to render an accounting of the 
fiscal toll the adversarial IDEA process takes on a school district's education resources as 
a whole. See Lennon, supra note 32, at 1318--19 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II)-
(III) (2006)) ("By the time the Supreme Court reached its decision against Forest Grove, 
the District had already spent $244,000 on the case, with another $4,400 needed for the 
trial court disposition .... Had the district court also sided with T.A.'s parents, the Dis-
trict would also have been liable for another $65,000 in tuition reimbursement and 
$400,000 for the parents' court costs. It is important to note that, while IDEA requires 
schools to pay all court costs when parents win, prevailing school districts only receive 
costs if the parents filed a suit that is 'frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation' or if 
the suit is 'presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary 
delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation."'). 
195. See Kocher, supra note 64, at 352. But see Lennon, supra note 32, at 1320 (noting 
that although school districts prevailed in more tuition reimbursement disputes than par-
ents, the schools did not do so at a significant rate). 
196. See Kocher, supra note 64, at 350-51 (comparing the parental burden of establish-
ing that the school district failed to provide their child with a FAPE and that the private 
placement was appropriate with that of the better-resourced school district which must 
establish only that a student's IEP was "reasonably calculated to enable the child to re-
ceive educational benefits"). 
197. Blumberg, supra note 88, at 178. 
198. Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1419. 
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tent to pay special attention to disadvantaged and underserved 
populations is clear. 199 Moreover, as IDEA has evolved through 
various reauthorization cycles, Congress and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education have revised the Act and its regulations with 
the intent of making IDEA's private enforcement mechanisms 
more accessible to means-challenged families. 200 The reforms in-
tended to serve this purpose include a provision permitting pre-
vailing families to collect the cost of attorney's fees from school 
districts in successful challenge cases, 201 an introduction of a less 
adversarial mediation option apart from the formal IDEA due 
process hearing for resolving disputes, 202 a broad information dis-
semination requirement concerning complaint mechanisms avail-
able to aggrieved parties, and a requirement that, when correct-
ing an IDEA violation, states extend the correction to all affected 
parties.203 
Despite such measures to strengthen IDEA's equality goals, a 
fundamental advocacy inequity persists; wealthy parents simply 
use private enforcement mechanisms more than poor parents.204 
Means-based inequities in private enforcement are all the more 
disconcerting because of the compounding effect of other IDEA 
structural provisions, creating bargaining inequities that further 
disadvantage parents without means. For example, key to the 
ID EA service model is development of the IEP for each child. But 
because this form of service delivery is highly individualized, par-
ents with greater educational and financial resources generally 
are in a better position to negotiate IEPs with school officials. 
Their higher level of engagement ensures that they receive more 
services than originally proposed by the school system and cer-
tainly more than socioeconomically disadvantaged parents would 
have. 205 
199. Id. at 1430-31; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(l) (2012) ("Improving educational re-
sults for children with disabilities is an essential element of our national policy of ensur-
ing equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for individuals with disabilities."). IDEA further mandates special initiatives 
for minority children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c). 
200. Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1431. 
201. Id. at 1424. 
202. Id. at 1425 (noting that this option was specifically introduced "to make the en-
forcement system friendlier to low-income families, on the theory that a less adversarial 
process would reduce the need for an attorney to begin with"). 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 1418. 
205. Id. at 1436-38. 
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Such inequities are far less subject to cure than the invidious 
racial segregation circumstances addressed in Brown. Advocacy 
victories for individual families under IDEA differ markedly from, 
and are less likely to produce, positive externalities than school 
segregation cases "where one person's enforcement of her 
right ... effectuates the full extent of that right [for others] 
.... "
206 Where less privileged parents already suffer from the bar-
gaining limitations that depreciate their advocacy posture under 
IDEA, it is unlikely they will be equipped to seize upon the advo-
cacy successes of others and press for com.parable services.207 
IDEA's structural norms prioritize awareness, information, and 
means as predictive measures of successful private enforcement 
outcomes. In doing so, the Act preordains that its enforcement 
matrix disproportionately burdens families of low socioeconomic 
status.208 Special education service delivery thus aligns against 
the very demographic groups most vulnerable to special needs di-
agnoses.209 In this respect, the Act's private enforcement processes 
fundamentally disrupt its own goal of equitably distributing spe-
cial needs services.210 
V. MEASURES TO RESTORE IDEA'S EQUITY PRINCIPLES AND 
REVITALIZE EQUALITY GOALS 
This part introduces proposals to address specific equity lapses 
in special education service delivery. In examining measures to 
revitalize the equality goals of IDEA, it is important to bear in 
mind that the retreat from IDEA's equality principles has been 
provoked by a myriad of judicial perspectives, statutory imple-
mentation norms, cultural biases, and social preferences. Just as 
no one factor purposefully or unilaterally introduced inequities or 
re-segregation consequences into IDEA, no single reform initia-
tive can restore equality to special education service delivery. Ra-
ther, a broad amalgam of reforms is necessary to address the 
many departures. Each of the proposed reforms individually of-
fers prospects for revitalizing specific equity premises of IDEA 
206. Id. at 1440. 
207. See id. at 1442-43 (noting that IDEA's state complaint system requirements at-
tempt to ensure that individual advocacy successes will be expanded to more broadly ap-
plied externalities benefitting other disabled students). 
208. See id. at 1416. 
209. See Oelrich, supra note 144, at 24-28. See generally supra Part III.A. 
210. See Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1417. 
l'i 
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and cumulatively presents the most realistic prospects for ensur-
ing disabled students meaningful educational opportunities 
equivalent to those offered to non-disabled students. 
A. Increased Funding for IDEA 
Increased funding for IDEA is an essential foundation for any 
reform package to restore equity in service delivery. Although the 
most heavily regulated of all federal education mandates and 
programs, the American special education system remains chron-
ically underfunded. 211 IDEA's 2004 reauthorization provided for 
specific funding levels to ensure that the federal share of special 
education service delivery would grow from 17.73% of total fund-
ing to 40% by 2012.212 In actuality, however, Congress never ap-
propriated sufficient funding to meet the levels specified as fund-
ing to states averaged only 15% of their per-pupil expenditures.213 
As a result, local and state budgets must compensate for the 
shortfall. 214 While funding deficiencies adversely affect services to 
all disabled students, socioeconomically disadvantaged groups are 
particularly vulnerable to negative resourcing consequences. Per-
ennial funding shortfalls essentially transform IDEA into a "bill 
of rights ... [more] available to children who attend resource-rich 
schools" that can compensate for federal funding deficiencies.215 
With the reality that federal funding has never kept pace with 
congressional commitments or with the increasing special educa-
tion costs at the local level, 216 one logical means of addressing spe-
cial education service inequalities involves converting IDEA from 
a discretionary funding item to a mandatory one the federal 
budget.217 While this proposal has garnered broad bipartisan sup-
211. Perna, supra note 25, at 562. 
212. Id. at 565. 
213. Phillips, supra note 172, at 1824. 
214. Perna, supra note 25, at 565-66 (noting that in 2014, for example, IDEA federal 
funding accounted for only 16% of the estimated excess costs of educating disabled stu-
dents, representing a reduction from the 17% federally funded in 2008 and a substantial 
reduction below the 2009 federal funding levels of 33%, which were also supplemented by 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act). 
215. COLKER, supra note 74, at 106. 
216. Perna, supra note 25, at 566 (noting that if IDEA had been fully funded from 1975 
to 2006, local schools would have received an additional $381.8 billion to devote to addi-
tional special education services). 
217. See id. at 567. 
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port, 218 prospects for congressional enactment of this measure are 
far from certain in light of the thirty-one-year history of consist-
ently deficient discretionary funding. For purposes of this analy-
sis, the mandatory 40% funding "solution" must reside as a highly 
desirable fiscal rfsolution that could (but likely would not in the 
near term)219 facilitate other measures recommended here to re-
solve IDEA's culture of inequity. Absent funding increases, school 
districts will never be able to respond fully to IDEA's promises. 220 
remaining reform proposals this comment are considered 
independently of more global fiscal reforms, but with the caution-
ary awareness that continuing funding deficiencies will impede 
the availability, or at least the reach of, other reforms. 
B. Expanded Advocacy Resources 
A key initiative to strengthen access and service remedies un-
der IDEA, particularly for low-income students, involves provid-
ing legal representation resources to supplement and support the 
problematic parental advocacy role. 221 One promising model for 
providing parents external support in navigating IDEA's personal 
enforcement terrain is the Education Services Advocate ("ESA") 
approach. This approach, which has been variously proposed us-
ing different constructs, 222 introduces a third participant into the 
private enforcement dialogue-a party with expertise in IDEA, 
special education, and public school resources and procedures. 
This third-party ESA can inform the parental advocacy role, but 
218. Id. at 568 ("More than fifty-five national organizations, including the National 
Conference of State Legislatures, the National Association of Counties, and the National 
League of Cities, along with all education groups that are part of the IDEA Funding Coali-
tion, strongly support this guaranteed full funding."). 
219. Prospects for full funding of IDEA are analyzed by various sources, but the most 
positive assessment comes from theorists who point out that in contrast to education 
spending generally, special education has a long history of broad, cross-party support. See, 
e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 30, at 1482-83 (discussing how federal funding for special edu-
cation has survived other recent aggressive spending cuts, even ones that specifically tar-
geted other educational funding streams for elimination or reduction). 
220. See Megan McGovern, Note, Least Restrictive Environment: Fulfilling the Promis-
es of IDEA, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 117, 135 (2015). 
221. See Valverde, supra note 23, at 623; see also, COLKER, supra note 74, at 245 ("It is 
crucial for parents to be provided with the free services of an educational advocate as soon 
as there is reason to believe that their child may qualify for special education services."). 
222. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 172, at 1847-52 (considering three alternative mod-
els for a program of supplemental advocacy for special education: public defender model 
employing full-time advocates, community volunteer model, and parent advocacy resource 
centers). 
i 
"' 
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is neither invested in, nor constrained by, financial and resource 
considerations in the same way a school official would be. 223 
Availability of an ESA to advise parents and support IDEA nego-
tiations would address the major deficiency in the Act's private 
enforcement construct-the erroneous presumption that a broad 
cross section of parents have sufficient knowledge, informational 
access, process acumen, and resources to assume an advocacy role 
to secure appropriate services for their disabled children.224 At the 
same time, the ESA's empowering influence on parental partici-
pation would benefit school districts by focusing negotiations on 
meaningful and informed considerations, thus expediting IDEA's 
complex procedural due process construct. 
The advocacy model that seems most effective in "fill[ing) the 
gap left by the IDEA's team formulation"225 is a public defender-
style team of full-time, state-employed special education advo-
cates. Under this model, when fully deployed, an ESA would be 
appointed to each child evaluated for IDEA services and would 
consult with parents about their child's special needs, accompany 
parents to IEP meetings, and support them in due process pro-
ceedings. 
The most realistic funding source for this resource-intensive 
program in the near term would draw upon an IDEA provision 
that authorizes the Secretary of Education to award discretionary 
grants to "parent training and information centers."226 As an in-
terim measure, until more robust funding sources could be se-
cured for external advocacy, ESAs could be resourced out of such 
information centers to provide selective support to parents on a 
means-tested basis. This approach might be further enhanced by 
engaging a volunteer corps of special education advocates, mod-
eled after guardian ad litem services for juveniles in the judicial 
system,227 to supplement ESA resources. 
223. See id. at 1852. 
224. See id. at 1828--29, 1852. 
225. Id. at 1852. 
226. Id. at 1845. In view of the history of deficient federal funding for IDEA, prospects 
are bleak for allocation of additional funding in general appropriations to support external 
advocacy services. See id. at 1845-46. 
227. See id. at 1849. 
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C. Codification of Compensatory Education Remedy 
Because tuition reimbursement offers no realistic form of re-
dress for parents financially incapable of paying the costs of uni-
lateral private placement up front, the compensatory education 
remedy has taken hold in many jurisdictions as a discretionary 
remedy ordered by hearing officers and judges under IDEA's gen-
eral relief provision. 228 This approach, often referenced as "the 
poor man's tuition reimbursement,"229 takes the form of various 
instructional enhancements or supplemental educational pro-
gramming to help a student recoup when progress lags due to a 
school district's failure to provide appropriate services. 230 has 
become the primary means of redress for disabled children denied 
a FAPE, but who must remain in an inappropriate or inadequate 
educational setting because their parents cannot cover the costs 
of removing them to a private school while negotiations contin-
231 
ue. 
Unlike tuition reimbursement, however, the compensatory ed-
ucation remedy is not expressly codified IDEA. 232 It is thus cur-
rently relegated "to a second class status with significant implica-
tions" for limiting the range of remedial measures available to 
low-income disabled students. 233 For example, absent a prescribed 
compensatory services remedy in IDEA, school districts have no 
228. Valverde, supra note 23, at 628; see, e.g., Lester H. ex rel Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 
F.2d 865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990) (allowing compensatory education services and reasoning that 
Congress "did not intend to offer a remedy only to those parents able to afford an alterna-
tive private education"). See generally Terry Jean Seligmann & Perry A. Zirkel, Searching 
Through the Legal Quagmire: Compensatory Education for IDEA Violations: The Silly Put-
ty of Remedies?, 45 URE. LAW. 281, 311 (2013) (emphasizing the importance of maintaining 
flexibility when utilizing compensatory education to cure IDEA violations). 
229. Seligmann & Zirkel, supra note 228, at 296. 
230. Valverde, supra note 23, at 628. 
231. Id. at 628; see also Seligmann & Zirkel, supra note 228, at 292-96 (noting that the 
Supreme Court's Burlington ruling that IDEA authorized tuition reimbursement as an 
equitable remedy within the court's discretionary power to grant "appropriate" relief pro-
vides the foundation for compensatory education remedies); T. Daris Isbell, Comment, 
Making Up for Lost Educational Opportunities: Distinguishing Between Compensatory 
Education and Additional Services as Remedies Under the IDEA, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1717, 
1743 (2011) ("Following the Burlington and Miener decisions, courts began to adopt com-
pensatory education as an 'appropriate' remedy available for students who had been de-
nied a FAPE. Courts reasoned that Congress would not have intended the availability of a 
remedy to depend on a parent's ability to front the costs of private education."). 
232. See Valverde, supra note 23, at 629-30 ("In fact, the only reference to compensato-
ry services as a remedy appears in the IDEA 2004 federal implementing regulations as a 
potential remedy within a state's internal complaint resolution process."). 
233. Id. 
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duty to disclose this avenue of redress in materials explaining 
procedural safeguards to parents. 234 Further, even when parents 
successfully pursue this remedial alternative, they are disadvan-
taged in comparison to those who can pursue tuition reimburse-
ment because they do not receive the equivalent "immediacy of 
benefits" that unilateral private school placement allows. 235 De-
spite any compensatory services that may ultimately be awarded, 
it is virtually impossible for students to fully recoup lost educa-
tional opportunities from such ''back end" awards. 236 This is par-
ticularly so when the service deficiencies have occurred at devel-
opmentally critical times.237 
D. Special Needs Voucher Programs 
The special needs voucher represents a further step along the 
financial support spectrum to assist disabled students in procur-
ing educational services in a private setting. Under the voucher 
approach already available in an increasing number of states, 
parents receive state-disbursed funds to enroll their special needs 
children in private school. Although the specific voucher provi-
sions in state statutes vary widely, most permit disabled students 
who attended school under an active IEP plan during the preced-
ing school year to receive a voucher.238 The voucher is used to fund 
tuition at any private school of choice by approximating the state-
funded cost of their education.239 
In terms of access, equity, and overall educational quality, spe-
cial needs vouchers offer some distinct advantages over both tui-
tion reimbursement and direct tuition payment options when 
properly constrained by oversight controls. First, they remove ad-
versarial proceedings from the equation and thus provide a ser-
vice-driven "exit strategy" to families of disabled children who are 
234. Id. at 630, 663 (noting that this inequity is compounded by the fact that, although 
parents are not provided notice in IDEA of the availability of compensatory education as a 
remedy, they are nonetheless subject to requirements and limitations, such as statutes of 
limitations provisions, for accessing the remedy). 
235. Id. at 630. 
236. See id. at 631 (noting that students awarded compensatory services are disadvan-
taged by the measurement methodology applied to this remedy, as'compared with tuition 
reimbursement). 
237. Wasserman, supra note 82, at 235. 
238. Wendy F. Hensel, Vouchers for Students with Disabilities: The Future of Special 
Education?, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 291, 292 (2010). 
239. Id. 
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either financially unable or unwilling to litigate IDEA claims be-
yond the school level. 240 This not only relieves parents of the ex-
pense and expertise challenges of IDEA's adversarial procedures, 
but also significantly reduces the public resources school districts 
must commit to .litigation. The resulting fiscal gains can be dedi-
cated to providing overall educational resources to the special 
needs children who remain in the public system and to education 
services generally. The voucher approach further enhances spe-
cial education resources because it induces private schools to 
compete for voucher-supported enrollments through programmat-
ic enhancements that heighten educational achievement of disa-
bled students consistent with the academic and social needs iden-
tified by parents. 241 
While there are clear equity and service bases for using special 
needs vouchers to help course-correct the drift away from IDEA's 
equality principles, several cautionary considerations must in-
form the practical use of this approach. If not implemented with 
adequate educational quality controls and oversight, special 
needs vouchers risk compromising the fundamental adequacy 
premise of IDEA by encouraging removal of disabled students to 
instructional settings where they may be neither monitored for 
receipt of services nor assessed for achievement progress and 
needs adjustments, as would be the case under traditional 
IEPs. 242 
Accounting for these potentially problematic consequences of 
special needs vouchers, this alternative is recommended to help 
restore equality to special education service delivery, but with 
highly specific limitations. To ensure that state legislatures de-
sign and implement voucher programs as educational quality-
240. See id. at 294-95. 
241. See id. at 292 ("Supporters argue that voucher programs offer a superior approach 
to traditional reform because they will increase competition among schools for children 
with disabilities and thereby enhance the educational achievement of these students."). 
242. See id. at 293 (noting that most states that have implemented special needs 
voucher programs require students receiving such vouchers to waive all rights under 
IDEA as a condition precedent to receiving state funds for private tuition); see also Eliza-
beth Adamo Usman, Reality Over Ideology: A Practical View of Special Needs Voucher 
Programs, 42 CAP. U. L. REV. 53, 76-77 (2014) (examining a major criticism of special 
needs voucher programs focusing on the lack of government oversight of private programs 
and discussing how, unlike public schools, private schools are not subject to special educa-
tion teacher training standards, are not required to implement the equivalent of IEPs to 
ensure that student needs are being addressed, and are not required to evaluate student 
progress-all factors that leave parents vulnerable to enrolling their special needs child in 
a school that cannot meet those needs). 
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motivated measures responsive to disabled students' instruction-
al and developmental needs, the programs must include control 
factors differentiating them from politically motivated "school 
choice" voucher programs. 243 This anticipates that special needs 
vouchers should not be disbursed to families who agree to sever 
their relationship with the IDEA structure and all the service de-
livery assessments it portends, as traditionally has been the case. 
Rather, IDEA must be revised to specify that special needs 
vouchers, if provided by states, must be conditioned upon specific 
assessment and oversight requirements to ensure that private in-
stitutions are offering services consistent with otherwise applica-
ble special education service delivery standards. 
E. Integrating an "Educational Opportunity" Standard into IDEA 
To fully reconcile the confusing, inconsistent, and litigation-
inducing lower court readings of Rowley and to reinvigorate 
IDEA's equality premise, one further reform would amend IDEA 
to embed a revised standard for F APE service delivery into the 
current statute. Absent such reform, the Rowley decision contin-
ues to hang as an outmoded and limiting threat to the equality 
goals that should inform special education access and accounta-
bility. Rowley's minimalist understanding of what is required to 
provide special needs students with an appropriate education not 
only robs IDEA's FAPE guarantee of meaningful equality assur-
ances, but it also spills over into broader service delivery deci-
sions and limits full and fair consideration of when alternative 
placements would best serve special needs students' interests. 
Congress should act to correct a missed opportunity in the 2004 
IDEA reauthorization, when it neither measurably revised the 
definition of FAPE nor elected to overrule the Rowley holding 
terpreting that definition. 244 Other post-Rowley amendments to 
243. See Hensel, supra note 238, at 348 ("If the genuine goal of voucher programs is to 
enhance the educational advancement of students with disabilities, they must be ground-
ed in meaningful evidence of programmatic superiority for this population rather than 
long-standing political arguments on the merits of school choice."); see also Usman, supra 
note 242, at 96 (urging consideration of special needs voucher pro~ams as responses to 
problems surrounding delivery of special education services and in isolation from the polit-
ically charged debate over universal voucher programs). 
244. See Free, supra note 44, at 229 (noting that "Congress left the definition of FAPE 
virtually unchanged from the prior law"). Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9)(A)-(D) (2004), with 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(8)(A)-(D) (2000). 
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support the view that appropriate education for disabled 
students has acquired "a higher substantive meaning,"246 one that 
d R l ' " b f•t" t d d " l · bl "247 ren ers ow ey s some ene l s an ar no onger via e. 
IDEA's most recent reauthorization requires development of IEPs 
that allow students "to progress academically as measured by the 
regular curriculum."248 This invites a standard that eluded the 
Rowley majority, suggesting that appropriateness in special edu-
cation service delivery is intended "to be synonymous with an 
equal right to learn" as compared with non-disabled peers. 249 Fur-
ther, the re-focused emphasis in IDEA on measurable outcomes 
in disability education services undermines the Rowley view that 
access to education services, without meaningful results, is suffi-
cient to satisfy special education entitlements.250 
is imperative special needs students have the benefit of 
a new standard for educational service obligations that can sus-
tain the equitable and meaningful educational opportunities in-
tended by 251 The most viable and meaningful replacement 
standard would be in keeping with the educational opportunity 
standard suggested in Rowley's concurring and dissenting opin-
ions and would replace IDEA's ambiguous and problematic "ap-
propriate" terminology with a requirement that disabled students 
be guaranteed an educational opportunity commensurate with 
that given to non-disabled children. 252 This approach would ac-
commodate the equality principles of the original IDEA legisla-
tion and respond to the more expansive amended provisions fo-
cusing on functional performance and meaningful results, not 
merely minimal outcome.253 
245. Valentino, supra note 7, at 157-58 (noting that, in particular, the 2004 IDEA 
reauthorization amendments introduced two significant revisions that had the effect of 
increasing the standard of what constitutes appropriate education-both related to ac-
countability of the education service delivery system for improving a child's functional per-
formance and progress). 
246. Id. at 155. 
247. Id. at 157. 
248. Free, supra note 44, at 231. 
249. Id. at 232. 
250. See id. at 231. 
251. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
252. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 214 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); see 
also Valentino, supra note 7, at 165-66 ("The educational opportunity standard fulfills 
both congressional and societal expectations of equality in educational opportunities for 
the disabled and the non-disabled, and, therefore should be the accepted standard in this 
country."). 
253. Valentino, supra note 7, at 165. 
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F. Coordinated Implementation and Realistic Limitations of 
Reform Measures 
Introducing into IDEA a meaningful standard for appropriate 
special education service delivery will in turn pave the way for 
more equitable placement determinations under the Act's inclu-
sion and tuition reimbursement principles. However, conceptual-
izing the issue of revitalizing IDEA's equality goals as one of 
righting the means-based disparities of reimbursement and in-
clusive placement practices is far too limiting to guarantee mean-
ingful reform.254 Nor will increased IDEA funding, without more 
fundamental structural reforms to the Act's private enforcement 
and service delivery protocols, resolve the privileging of families 
with means in advocating for special needs children. 
Therefore, the amalgam of reforms advocated here is also de-
pendent on external measures to support and inform parental ad-
vocacy (special education advocates) and to expand means of re-
sourcing alternative placements (compensatory education 
services, direct tuition payments, and vouchers). If implemented 
individually, any of these recommended reforms would offer 
measurable equality-leveling benefits. If realized cumulatively, 
they offer the most promising prospect for course correction the 
interest of educational equality for special needs students. 
Despite their collective promise, it would be fair and reasonable 
to argue that the reforms proposed here cannot fully restore the 
equality underpinnings on which IDEA was founded. Incremental 
adjustments to invite improved resourcing, advocacy support, 
more equitable access to private educational alternatives, 
service delivery standards responsive to individual students' 
needs rather than merely their foundational access rights can on-
ly go so far remediating the equality lapses that currently de-
fine IDEA implementation and private enforcement. As has been 
noted concerning specific reforms advocated here, resourcing the 
necessary changes is costly, requires oversight and control safe-
guards, and, in some instances, reintroduces inequities by sup-
porting special education service delivery a manner may 
detract from overall public education quality. Critics of measures 
that enhance and equalize access to special needs education are 
not wholly misguided in voicing the concern that such initiatives 
254. COLKER, supra note 74, at 244-45. 
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necessarily divert resources from the general public school popu-
lation,255 expand program and service access routes for special 
needs students that potentially undermine the inclusive school 
movement, 256 or encourage use of private school resources as to 
defeat promoting integration across the disability line.257 
Certainly, in designing a practical and workable reform para-
digm, we cannot limit our gaze to special needs beneficiaries only. 
Finite resources, fiscal realities, and the inevitable social tensions 
between responsive special needs service delivery and the bene-
fits of the integration presumption demand that we apply a more 
balanced perspective to designing solutions that support IDEA's 
equity legacy. 
We also cannot overlook the reality of social context and re-
source limitations. Admittedly, the success of any of these reform 
measures will be constrained by prevailing social norms, cultural 
biases, and demographic inequities that permit misclassification 
and overrepresentation of certain minority populations in isolated 
special needs settings or invite gross disparities in per-pupil edu-
cational funding resources among school districts. 258 At the same 
time, the reforms proposed here offer realistic prospects for cor-
recting IDEA's fundamental departure from its intended equality 
course. Each measure advanced here reroutes IDEA more in 
alignment with ensuring service delivery to each individual disa-
bled student, rather than preferencing selected individual stu-
dents whose parents have the time, financial means, education, 
and expertise to attain the benefits offered under the statute.259 
In the final analysis, none of the reforms urged here will take 
the place of more expansive resolution of the social and fiscal 
structural limitations that have challenged educational equality 
255. See id. at 242. 
256. See Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and Fragmented Protections: Accessing 
Education, Work, and Health Care, in RIGHTING EDUCATIONAL WRONGS: DISABILITY 
STUDIES IN LAW AND EDUCATION 265, 288 (Arlene S. Kanter & Beth A. Ferri eds., 2013) 
(discussing the benefits of "inclusive schools" that provide an approach to learning where 
educators work with all students in integrated groups regardless of perceived or diagnosed 
disabilities). 
257. See Minow, supra note 15, at 53. 
258. See COLKER, supra note 74, at 245 ("Quite simply, children in middle-class school 
districts should not be receiving more expensive special education services than children 
in poor school districts. Our system of funding public schools through property taxes must 
end in order to create more education equity."). 
259. See id. at 240-41. 
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pursuits from Brown through all reauthorizations of IDEA But 
each area of reform identified will go far toward recognizing spe-
cial education as the realistically available continuum of services 
it was intended to be for meeting individualized needs of disabled 
children, rather than an inequitably monitored and service defi-
cient destination for problem students. 260 
CONCLUSION 
Just as the disability education rights movement was propelled 
forward by the equality rationale of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion, 261 so too has special education paralleled the post-Brown re-
segregation patterns, experiencing significant retreat from the 
equality principles on which it was founded. The Supreme Court's 
Rowley decision, the Court's ensuing rulings on tuition reim-
bursement, and IDEA's own private enforcement construct have 
provisioned a special education service delivery culture that nei-
ther consistently responds to nor furthers IDEA's fundamental 
equality principles.262 
IDEA's emphasis on the individual with disabilities puts in 
place a construct under which education plans and enforcement 
mechanisms are both intended to be personalized and individual-
ly executed.263 Somewhat ironically, this focus has a distinct 
downside. In the mechanics of manipulating IDEA's provisions to 
effect desired results, the individual children who benefit from 
the law are those who have parents equipped with expertise and 
resources to attain the benefits offered by the statute.264 
While IDEA has produced undeniable gains in both education 
access and quality for students with disabilities, special needs 
students remain "those most at risk of being left behind."265 And 
although special education has acquired a solid base of "civil 
260. See Wendy F. Hensel, The Case for Inclusive Eligibility Under the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act, in RIGHTING EDUCATIONAL WRONGS: DISABILITY STUDIES 
IN LAW AND EDUCATION 242, 262 (Arlene S. Kanter & Beth A. Ferri eds., 2013). 
261. McGovern, supra note 220, at 118. 
262. See generally Free, supra note 44, 204-06 (arguing that in order to provide for an 
equal opportunity intended by the IDEA, Congress should overrule the Rowley decision 
and give clear guidance). 
263. See id. at 203-04. 
264. See COLKER, supra note 74, at 241. 
265. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE IN SPECIAL EDUC., supra note 145, at 4. 
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rights and legal protections,''266 the special needs population it 
serves remains exceedingly vulnerable to legislative, judicial, and 
social lapses in vigilance that undermine the equality premise of 
special education reform. Only with strategic implementation of 
substantive, structural, and fiscal reforms as proposed here can 
the fundamental equity principles of IDEA be restored to mean-
ingfully equalize educational opportunity within the full special 
needs demographic. 
Kerrigan O'Malley * 
266. Id. 
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